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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays in labor economics and political economy.
Chapter 1 studies the relative decrease of college graduate women’s marriage rates in
developed Asian countries—the “Gold Miss” phenomenon. Using a dynamic model, I show
that this phenomenon can be explained by the interaction of rapid economic growth combined
with the intergenerational transmission of gender attitudes. I test the implications of the
model using three datasets: Japanese General Social Survey, American Time Use Survey,
and the Census. First, in the Japanese data, I ﬁnd a positive relationship between a mother’s
education (and employment) and her son’s gender attitudes. Second, in the U.S., housework
time of Asian women is inversely related to the female labor force participation rate in
husband’s country of origin. Lastly, college graduate Korean and Japanese women in the
U.S. have greater options in the marriage market.
Chapter 2 (with Johanna Mollerstrom) uses a citizen candidate model to investigate
the role of gradualism and election when agents have present-biased preferences. We ﬁnd
that gradual reforms, despite its ineﬃciencies, may actually be welfare-enhancing relative
to big bang, because time-inconsistent voters would otherwise delay implementing policies
with front-loaded costs. In order to commit to gradualism (and avoid procrastination),
sophisticated agents elect an agenda setter more patient than the median voter. The results
suggest the potential virtues of gradual reforms under time-inconsistency, and shows how
election may serve as a commitment device.
Chapter 3 empirically examines how the burden of the second shift—housework—is in-
ﬂuenced by the individual’s and spouse’s cultural background. Using the American Time
iiiUse Survey, I analyze the time spent on household chores among married men and women,
by their country of origin and generation since migrating to the U.S. I ﬁnd diﬀerential
eﬀects by sex and generation. First generation’s housework time, particularly women’s, is
inversely related to the female labor force participation rates in their father’s birthplace, and
is also inﬂuenced by the source country and U.S. nativity of their spouses. Assimilation to
U.S. gender roles occurs among the second generation such that variation in housework time
decreases relative to the ﬁrst generation.
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viii1. Housewife, “Gold Miss,” and Equal: The Evolution of Educated
Women’s Role in Asia and the U.S.
1.1 Introduction
Marriage rates have decreased among women in Japan, South Korea (hereafter Korea),
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong during the past several decades. As covered in a recent
article in The Economist, “The Asian avoidance of marriage is new, and striking. ... In
South Korea, young men complain that women are on marriage strike.”1 The majority of
women on this “marriage strike” are highly educated, four-year college graduates. Koreans
call this growing group of educated single women “Gold Misses.”2
Later marriages are common among the educated worldwide. What is striking about the
phenomenon in Asia, however, is that Gold Misses are not merely delaying marriage. Rather,
they are remaining single and at a much higher cost than in the West. Cohabitation is rare
and out-of-wedlock childbirths make up less than 2 percent of total childbirths in Korea
and Japan.3 Moreover, the gap in marriage rates between college graduate and non-college
graduate women has not diminished in Asia—it has grown. In the U.S., in contrast, the gap
1 The Economist, “The ﬂight from marriage,” August 20th 2011.
2 Terms have been coined in each region to refer to this group—in Korean Gold Miss (because they are
“old misses” but highly educated and ﬁnancially independent), in Japanese Hanako-zoku (literally “Hanako
tribe,” named after the readers of the consumer magazine Hanako, which targets young single women) or
Wagamama (translated as “single parasites” because most unmarried adults live with their parents), and
in Chinese Sheng-nu (translated as “leftover women”). Among these, I choose to use the term Gold Miss
throughout this paper.
3 Korea and Japan are ranked the two lowest among OECD countries in out-of-wedlock childbirths. 38
percent of births are out-of-wedlock in the U.S. (OECD Family Database, 2011)
1narrowed and reversed in the mid-1970s.4
Why are there Gold Misses and why are they increasing in developed Asia? This paper
argues that the interaction of Asia’s rapid economic growth combined with the intergener-
ational transmission of gender attitudes causes the Gold Miss phenomenon. Wage growth
creates incentives for more women to become educated and to participate in the labor mar-
ket. However, gender norms do not shift at once; they are passed from one generation to the
next. Men are still accustomed to women being housewives as in their mothers’ generation
and have preference for wives’ household services. Thus, some educated women choose to
remain single rather than marry “traditional” men.
The story sketched above emerges from a simple dynamic model of intergenerational
transmission of gender attitudes, in which the fraction of men with preference for wives’
household time decreases with the fraction of educated women in the previous generation.
Women’s education, marriage, and household time allocation decisions are functions of the
endogenously evolving preferences within the male population.5 The model predicts that
Gold Misses are more likely to arise in economies that experience rapid, rather than gradual,
growth in women’s wages.
To empirically evaluate this hypothesis, I use three diﬀerent datasets. First, I use the
Japanese General Social Survey to explore the gender attitudes and marriage patterns of
Japanese men. Second, I use the American Time Use Survey to study time allocation at
home among U.S. immigrants from Gold Miss countries. Lastly, I use the U.S. census data to
analyze marriage patterns of men and women from two major Gold Miss countries—Korea
and Japan.
I ﬁnd evidence consistent with the implications of my model. First, men’s gender attitudes
are aﬀected by the economic status of women in their parents’ generation. Men in Japan
4 For references on the trends of U.S. college graduate women’s marriage and fertility, see for example,
Kalmijn (1991), Goldin (2004), Schwartz and Mare (2005), Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) and Shang and
Weinberg (2012).
5 c.f., Fern´ andez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004).
2who had working or college graduate mothers during childhood have more egalitarian views
regarding gender roles, and are more likely to have working wives. Among U.S. immigrants
from Gold Miss countries, U.S. born men spend about 3 hours per week more on housework
relative to foreign born men while reducing their wives’ time spent on housework.
Second, women marry “less traditional” men (rather than “traditional”) when they are
available. In Japan, the probability that a college graduate man ever marries is positively
correlated with his mother’s LFP. Among Koreans and Japanese residing in the U.S., foreign
born women are 20 percentage points more likely than their male peers to marry a non-
Korean or non-Japanese. I exploit regional variation in the composition of male population
to show that Korean and Japanese women are more likely to marry out of their ethnic group
when the foreign born share is higher among Korean and Japanese men.
Third, the increase in Gold Misses is less severe when the fraction of “less traditional”
men in the marriage market is larger. In contrast to Korea and Japan, I ﬁnd that college
graduate Korean and Japanese women in the U.S. are as likely to be married as the non-
college graduates.
The results indicate that educated women’s marriage prospects are better when the
generation gap in women’s educational attainment (and LFP) is smaller. This oﬀers new
insight into the forces underlying the evolution of educated women’s role. Previous studies
have focused on the supply-side determinants such as the introduction of the pill, the opening
up of co-ed universities, and the advancements in household appliances technology.6 These
changes enabled the supply of educated and working women to increase in the marriage
market. However, this paper demonstrates that an equally important determinant is the
demand-side—whether men want educated and working wives who outsource housework—
and thereby shows how women’s role may not transition smoothly from housewife to equal
even with economic growth.7 I also add to the line of research on cultural norms by providing
6 See for example, Goldin and Katz (2002), Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005), Greenwood and
Guner (2009), and Goldin and Katz (2011).
7 Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern (2008) share similar intuitions, although they do not present a formal model.
3an example of how rigid gender roles may weaken in response to changes in women’s relative
wages, and research on the assimilation of immigrants by explaining why there may be
signiﬁcant gender gaps in marital assimilation.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview
of the Gold Miss phenomenon with statistics from developed Asian countries. Section 1.3
presents the dynamic model. Section 1.4 lays out the empirical results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Background: The Gold Miss Phenomenon in Asia
Gold Miss (and analogous terms used in Asia, see footnote 2) colloquially means a never
married woman in her thirties or older who has received at least a four-year college education,
has her own career, and earns a higher-than-average yearly income. She is not just a “Miss,”
she is a rich one. In order to use one general standard for diﬀerent countries, in this paper I
deﬁne Gold Miss as a four-year college graduate woman over age 35 who has never married.9
The Gold Miss phenomenon then refers to the increase in the share of college graduate
women who have never married relative to that of non-college graduate women.
The Gold Miss countries are the East Asian “tiger economies” that achieved economic
miracles over the past half-century. Figure 1.1 depicts the historical trend of GDP per
capita in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan in comparison to the U.S. and
the world average from 1900 to present. The growth trajectories of the Asian economies
Looking at cross-country diﬀerences in fertility rates, they argue that countries where women’s household
status lags behind their labor market opportunities experience the lowest fertility rates.
8 See for example, Giuliano (2007), Fern´ andez and Fogli (2009), Alesina and Giuliano (2010), Alesina,
Nunn, and Guiliano (2011), and Hwang (2013b) for discussions on the persistence of family culture. Regard-
ing assimilation proﬁles by gender, Blau and Kahn (2007) study Mexican immigrants in the U.S. and ﬁnd
dramatic assimilation in labor supply for female immigrants.
9 Age thirty-ﬁve is young enough to capture recent developments and old enough to distinguish between
“marriage delayed” and “marriage forgone” among women in Asia. Despite the rise in women’s age at ﬁrst
marriage—29 in Japan and Korea, 28 in Taiwan, 30 in Hong Kong, and 28 in Singapore (Jones and Gubhaju,
2009)—marriage rates fall starkly once women reach their late thirties. The age-speciﬁc marriage rate for
brides in age group 35–39 is only 12.2 (per thousand) in Korea and 9.2 (per thousand) in Japan (Statistics
Korea, 2010 and Vital Statistics of Japan, 2009). This is not unrelated to the fact that female fertility drops
sharply after age 35.
4share a common pattern—rapid economic development from the 1960s onward (with growth
rates in excess of 7 percent a year). The U.S. has had a higher GDP per capita than Asia
since the early 20th century and follows a more gradual growth path throughout.
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Figure 1.1: GDP Per Capita Trends of Developed Asian Countries
Notes. GDP per capita measured in 1990 international (Geary-Khamis) dollar units. Data are taken from
Angus Maddison’s Historical Statistics of the World Economy.
Asia’s growth opened up (and beneﬁted from) new opportunities for women. According
to the United Nations statistics, labor force participation rates of women in the age group
25–34 in Japan, Korea, and Singapore increased by more than 17 percentage points from 1985
to 2006.10 Educational attainment shows a similar pattern. There were virtually no college
graduate women in East Asia before World War II but with economic development and
10 The statistics for Japan, Korea, and Singapore in 1985 are 56.6 percent, 39.2 percent, and 58.3 percent,
respectively. U.S. begins at around 70 percent and increased by 5 percentage points from 1985 to 2006.
5education reforms, tertiary enrollments greatly increased. In Japan, although the college
gender gap persists, women’s college enrollment rates rose from near zero in 1955 to 41
percent in 2007 (Basic School Survey). In Korea, women’s college enrollment rates increased
from 20 percent to 55 percent in just 18 years and the college gender gap has disappeared
(Statistical Yearbook of Education).
Despite the transformation in women’s LFP and education, marriage prospects for ed-
ucated women in developed Asian nations have evolved quite diﬀerently from that of the
West. Figure 1.2 depicts the fraction ever married among men and women in their late
30s in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and the U.S. by education level. In all four
Asian countries, higher education increases the marriage probability for men but lowers the
marriage probability for women. The consequences are twofold: the least educated men are
left single unless they “import” brides from, for example, developing South Asian countries,
and highly educated women remain unmarried and become Gold Misses.11 In the U.S., on
the other hand, education has a positive relationship with marriage probability for both men
and women.
The negative education gradient for women in Asia has even become steeper than in
the past. Figure 1.3 plots the diﬀerence in fraction ever married between college graduates
and non-college graduates in each birth cohort, among men and women over age 35 in Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, and the U.S.12 Panel A shows that for men, college graduates’ marriage
probabilities increased relative to non-college graduates.’ Panel B shows that for women, not
only are college graduates less likely to be ever married than non-college graduates, but the
gap has widened over time in Asian countries. For the most recent 1970s birth cohort, the
11 See Kawaguchi and Lee (2012) for a discussion about female migration from developing Asian countries
to developed East Asian countries. They ﬁnd that foreign brides currently comprise 4 to 35 percent of
newlyweds in Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan although there is no raw sex ratio imbalance in these
countries. Men with low socioeconomic statuses marry foreign women.
12 Singapore and Taiwan do not provide Census micro-data. Including all individuals over age 35 may
overstate the marriage rates of earlier cohorts since they are being observed at later ages than recent cohorts.
The bias is expected to be relatively unimportant, however, since ﬁrst marriages are rare once women reach
their late thirties. (See footnote 9 for more detail.)
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to “Post-secondary (non-degree)” in Hong Kong, “Junior College/Vocational School” in Japan, less than
four-year colleges in Korea and the U.S., and “Diploma & Professional Qualiﬁcation” in Singapore. College
refers to “Post-secondary (degree)” in Hong Kong and four-year universities in other countries. See Appendix
A.1.2 for details. Since Japan and Singapore do not report separately for graduate school, “College” also
includes those with more than a college degree in these countries.
diﬀerence amounts to 14 percentage points in Hong Kong and 5 percentage points in Japan
and Korea. This contrasts with the upward slope in the U.S.: the diﬀerence in fraction ever
married between college and non-college women has switched from negative to positive for
American women.
How do the Asian college graduate women of earlier and later cohorts diﬀer? One major
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Figure 1.3: Diﬀerence in Fraction Ever Married Between College Graduates and Non-College Grad-
uates, Over Age 35
Notes. Diﬀerence in the fraction ever married between college graduates and non-college graduates, among
men and women over age 35 in each birth cohort. Data are from the 2006 Hong Kong Population Census,
2000–2008 Japanese General Social Survey, 1995 and 2000 Korean Population Census, 2012 Korean Econom-
ically Active Population Survey, and the 2010 American Community Survey. See Appendix A.1 for details.
The 1965 cohort in Japan includes birth years 1965–1972 and the 1970 birth cohort in Korea includes birth
years 1970–1976. College refers to four-year colleges in Japan, Korea and the U.S., and post-secondary
(degree) levels in Hong Kong. I exclude respondents still attending school at the time of the survey.
8diﬀerence is in their careers. College graduate women in Asia are now not only working
but are also increasingly taking on professional full-time occupations once considered to
be men’s. For instance, only 19 percent of managerial/professional workers in Korea were
female in 1971 but is now 41 percent (Economically Active Population Survey). The female-
to-male median earnings of full-time employees in Japan increased from 45 percent in 1954
to 64 percent in 2006, and in Korea from 42 percent in 1975 to 67 percent in 2009. This
contrasts with the earlier development in the U.S.—the ratio was 46 percent from as early
as 1890.13
Women’s new roles imply conﬂict for Asian families. Confucian ethics prescribe gender
norms in all Gold Miss countries that for centuries described the ideal woman as a “good
wife, wise mother.”14 Despite the growing number of dual-earner households, the belief
that women should be responsible for child rearing and housework continues. Arranged
marriage has nearly disappeared but marriage is still considered a union of two families
(rather than just the man and the woman). Hence, relatives and parents (in-laws) are
continuously watching over the married couple’s life. Pre-marital cohabitation and out-of-
wedlock childbirths are socially stigmatized.
According to the 2005–2008 World Value Survey, the percentage of people who disagreed
with the statement “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”
is 66.4 percent in the U.S., but only 44.2 percent in Hong Kong, 17.9 percent in Japan, 26.4
percent in Korea, and 36 percent in Taiwan.15 To the statement “It is more important for
a wife to help her husband’s career than to have one herself,” 70.4 percent of Americans
disagreed (General Social Survey) whereas the percentage of respondents who disagreed is
13 Japanese data are from the Statistics and Information Department of the Ministry of Health, Labour,
and Welfare. Korean data are from the 1975–2009 Occupational Wage Survey. See Goldin (1990) Table 3.2
for U.S. data.
14 ry¯ osai kenbo in Japanese, hyun mo yang ch’o in Korean, and xi´ an q¯ i li´ ang m` u in Chinese.
15 Possible answers are (1) Agree, (2) Disagree, and (3) Neither. (Don’t know and missing are excluded.)
The sample size for each country is U.S. 1,238, Hong Kong 1,225, Japan 1,042, Korea 1,197, and Taiwan
1,226. No statistics are available for Singapore on this question.
9less than half of that in Asia—22.9 percent in Japan, 35 percent in Korea, and 31.2 percent
in Taiwan (East Asian Social Survey).16
Time Use Survey ﬁndings conﬁrm these beliefs. Among dual-earner households, women’s
average time spent on household activities is at least 2 hours (per day) longer than men’s in
Japan and Korea (Japanese Time Use Survey, 2006 and Korean Time Use Survey, 2009).17
Gender gap exists in the U.S. as well, but the magnitude is much smaller—50 minutes per
day (American Time Use Survey, 2003–2011).
There is virtually no diﬀerence in household appliances technology between the Gold
Miss countries and other developed countries. The relative price of hiring a live-in domestic
worker in the U.S. and in East Asia is also comparable, at about 40 percent of the mean
wage of native college graduate women. In fact, the price is lower in Taiwan and Singapore,
and particularly lower in Hong Kong, than in the U.S.18
Thus, although the Gold Miss phenomenon may look similar with what occurred in the
U.S. and elsewhere when women ﬁrst began to graduate from college, there are important
diﬀerences. In the early twentieth century, women could not easily have both family and
career with the (lack of) contraceptive methods, household appliances technology, market
substitutes for household production, and labor market opportunities (Goldin, 2004). As
surveyed in this section, women in developed Asia today do not face these conditions. Rather,
the constraints of marriage derive from traditional household roles families expect from the
wife and daughter-in-law.
16 Possible answers are (1) Strongly agree, (2) Agree, (3) Disagree, and (4) Strongly disagree in the GSS
and (1) Strongly agree, (2) Fairly agree, (3) Somewhat agree, (4) Neither agree or disagree, (5) Somewhat
disagree, and (6) Strongly disagree in the EASS. (Don’t know and missing are excluded.) The sample size
for each country is U.S. 13,748, Japan 2,130, Korea 1,605, and Taiwan 2,102. Singapore and Hong Kong are
not included.
17 See Appendix A.1 for information on these datasets.
18 Hong Kong has a foreign domestic worker (FDW) program and the government sets the minimum wage
for these workers. According to Cortes and Pan (2013), the minimum wage is more than four times lower
than high skilled women’s wage. Though limited, Taiwan and Singapore have similar programs; the FDW’s
wage is about 30–40 percent of native college graduate women’s. Japan and Korea have stricter immigration
policies. The relative price of live-in domestic workers is nearly half of native college graduate women’s wage,
as in the U.S. (See Huang, Yeoh, and Rahman, 2005 for more information on foreign domestic workers.)
101.3 Model of the Intergenerational Transmission of
Gender Attitudes and of Marriage
Building on the framework of Fern´ andez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), I develop a simple
dynamic model where women’s education, marriage, and labor force participation decisions
are functions of wages and the endogenously evolving types within the male population—
“traditional” and “modern.” I deﬁne a man as traditional if he has preference for his wife’s
household services and modern if he is willing to substitute wife’s housework with his own
or with market goods and services. The fraction of modern men increases with the fraction
of educated women in the previous generation.
When women’s wages rise, more women choose to stay single than marry traditional
husbands. The key distinguishing prediction of this model is the path dependency of the
Gold Miss phenomenon. Given that men initially hold traditional values, economies where
women’s wages increased rapidly are more likely to experience the Gold Miss phenomenon
compared with economies where women’s wages increased gradually over time. In the rapid
case, a large discrepancy appears between the women’s roles when men were growing up and
women’s roles in their own cohort. As a result, there are not enough modern men for the
newly educated women to marry.19
I make the following assumptions for tractability. Women diﬀer in their eﬀort costs of
becoming educated and can choose to invest in education (“educated,” E) or not (“uned-
ucated,” U). If a woman invests in her education, she gets wage wE in the labor market,
which is higher than the wage she would get if uneducated, wU. wE is randomly drawn from
a distribution that varies exogenously over time. Men, on the other hand, are assumed to
19 Standard models of household production can also show that growth in women’s earning power reduces
the gain from marriage or that positive assortative mating becomes optimal as technology advances (Becker,
1991). However, they cannot explain why marriage patterns would evolve diﬀerently across similarly devel-
oped countries. Intra-household models also face this limitation if bargaining power is a function of only
wages. (See Chiappori and Donni, 2011 for a survey of this literature.) Assuming that the sharing rule is
aﬀected by other “distribution factors,” in which gender attitudes can be a component, is an option. The
diﬀerence with my model would then be that the husband’s type aﬀects the wife’s utility via consumption.
11have homogeneous skill level and earn wm in the labor market.20 Men diﬀer in their cultural
upbringing: those who grew up around educated women develop less traditional gender atti-
tudes (“modern,” M) compared with those who grew up around housewives (“traditional,”
T). All agents are rational and forward-looking.
The timing in the model is as follows. In the ﬁrst period, women decide whether or not to
become educated. In the second period, men and women are randomly matched and decide
whether to get married or remain single. In the third period, men and women decide on
a time allocation between market activity and household production. Below I describe the
intergenerational dynamics and then solve for each stage of the decision-making process.
1.3.1 Intergenerational Dynamics
Gender attitudes (or more speciﬁcally, men’s preferences for wives’ household services)
are transmitted from mother to son. Assuming, as is reasonable for Asia, that only married
women have children, the fraction of modern men (λM) in cohort t then depends on the
fraction of married educated women in the previous cohort. The dynamics of the system are
thus given by:
λMt+1(λMt) = pEt(λMt)λEt(λMt) (1.1)
where pEt is the marriage probability of educated women and λEt is the fraction of educated
women at t (both are functions of λMt).21
This intergenerational linkage can be supported by at least two diﬀerent mechanisms.
First, parents exert a direct socialization eﬀort to inﬂuence their children’s process of pref-
erence formation. This is similar to the idea of “direct vertical socialization” discussed in
20 If men also diﬀered in their educational attainment and wages, there would be four categories of men,
with the modern and educated being the most attractive husband and the traditional and uneducated being
the least attractive. Figure 1.2 Panel A and Kawaguchi and Lee (2012) address this outcome. Since my
paper’s focus is on the Gold Misses, I do not add the education dimension to men. But the traditional and
uneducated men not being able to marry is a by-product of the Gold Miss phenomenon, and can thus be
explained by the same mechanisms addressed here.
21 pEt is deﬁned in equation (1.6) below. How λEt is endogenously determined is discussed in Section 1.3.4.
12Bisin and Verdier (2000). Educated mothers teach their sons that a family can function well
with substitutes of her time.
Second, people tend to imitate others and like those who are similar to themselves, as
is well-documented in research on peer eﬀects, discrimination, and social norms.22 Even if
mothers do not teach speciﬁc values to their children, boys are likely to emulate their parents
or other role models when they form their own families.23
Whichever mechanism is at work (or most likely, a combination of these mechanisms), the
dynamics can be expressed as equation (1.1) in reduced form.24 Note that since preferences
are formed during childhood, men cannot freely choose to be one type or the other (the cost
of changing one’s attitudes is very high).
1.3.2 Household Decision
All individuals are endowed with a unit of time. Within a married household, each
spouse decides how much time t to allocate to market activity; the remaining time (1 − t)
is allocated to household production. Market activity yields a marginal return (wage) of
wm for men and wf for women, where I assume wm > wf.25 Time allocations are a Nash
equilibrium of a game in which each spouse decides his or her time allocation taking as given
22 See for example, Becker (1957) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
23 Similar eﬀects may exist for girls as well: girls who grew up in male-breadwinner households may be
more traditional than those who grew up in dual-earner households. For example, Olivetti and Patacchini
(2012) study how women’s working behavior is inﬂuenced by the working status of their mothers and their
childhood friends’ mothers using the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health. However, when
economic growth creates opportunities for girls that did not exist for their mothers, girls are no longer
constrained to traditional roles. Thus, given the time frame of my model—the past century during which
women’s wages increased greatly—the intergenerational transmission plays a much smaller role (on net) for
girls than for boys. Section 1.4.1 presents supportive evidence (see footnote 40).
24 I do not take a stance on the speciﬁc mechanism as I do not attempt to distinguish between them in my
empirical work.
25 When wf is higher than wm, the wife works full-time whereas the husband works part-time (tf = 1,tm =
1−
2β
wm). When wf becomes suﬃciently higher, νf intersects with VfM. After that point, an educated woman
would choose not to marry even the modern type because the gain from consuming her income all by herself
becomes larger than the gain from having a husband doing housework. In all countries, however, women’s
wages are still lower than men’s, and hence I abstract from this case.
13the time allocation of the other partner. (Results do not depend on the this speciﬁcation.
See Appendix A.2.1.)
The welfare of a married individual consists of utility from consumption and utility from
household public goods. Consumption is derived from total household earnings, wmtm+wftf,
which is split equally between the couple. The household public good is a function of the
total time invested in household production, (1 − tm) + (1 − tf), and β > 0 is the value of
the public good to each individual.
The utility function of a man m married to a woman f is:
Vm(wm,wf) = max
0≤tm≤1
1
2
(tmwm + tfwf) + βlog((1 − tm) + (1 − tf)) (1.2)
where he takes tf as given. Men’s utility function depends only on wages.
On the other hand, the utility function of a married woman f also diﬀers by husband’s
type j = M,T:
Vfj(wm,wf) = max
0≤tf≤1
1
2
(tmwm +tfwf)+βlog((1−tm)+ (1−tf))−(α0 +α1(tf))Ij=T (1.3)
where Ij=T is an indicator for whether husband is traditional type. That is, a married woman
incurs a direct disutility of α1(tf), which is an increasing function of tf, and a ﬁxed amount
of α0 if her husband is traditional.26 For analytical purposes, let α1(tf) be an indicator
function: α1 > 0 when tf > 0 and α1 = 0 when tf = 0. Emotional gain from marriage may
be reduced when the husband and in-laws are traditional, due to increased marital tensions,
pressure to take better care of family members or to quit her job, or domestic violence.27
Note that the share
1
2 is not aﬀected by male type. That is, a traditional husband does
26 See Appendix A.2.1 for a discussion on how the model changes when the disutility term is only in the
men’s utility function.
27 Refer to Section 1.2 to see cross-country variation in responses to stylized gender role questions. Research
on the relationship between husbands’ gender attitudes and the quality of marital relations provide further
evidence. See for example, Hochschild (1989), Min (2001), and Rubin (1983).
14not “steal” more from his wife than a modern husband, and hence there is ﬁnancial beneﬁt
from marriage regardless of the husband’s type. This is a conservative assumption; if the
share also depends on the husband’s type such that women married to traditional men get
less than half, this would make traditional men even less attractive as partners (see footnote
19). Men’s productivity at home is also assumed to be the same. The willingness to engage
in household tasks may diﬀer (and hence be incorporated in the disutility term), but it is
unlikely that there are fundamental diﬀerences across men in their ability to do them.
The ﬁrst order conditions of equations (1.2) and (1.3) when the husband is a modern
type yield: 
  
  
2 − tm − tf =
2β
wm
2 − tm − tf =
2β
wf
respectively. Because wm  = wf, at least one of the agents must be at a corner solution.
There are two possible cases: (i) when wf ≤ 2β, tm = 1 and tf = 0, (ii) when wf > 2β,
tm = 1 and tf = 1−
2β
wf. It is always optimal for married men to work full-time regardless of
women’s wages because men’s wages are higher than women’s. A married woman becomes
a housewife in case (i) but works part-time in case (ii).28 Henceforth, I assume for clarity
that uneducated women’s wages are lower than 2β and educated women’s wages are higher
than 2β.
When the husband is a traditional type, because of the disutility term α1(tf), the wife
starts to work at a wage higher than 2β.29 I denote this threshold wage as wE.
28 Outcomes are not assumed to be Pareto eﬃcient ex-ante. Case (i) turns out to be Pareto eﬃcient but
(ii) is not when wf is high enough to allow an educated woman to reject a traditional man. A Pareto
improvement is then possible if the traditional man oﬀers her a “bribe” to compensate her for the disutility
she incurs from marrying him. Whether this can be a binding contract is highly questionable, however. The
contract would require the husband to allow his wife to consume more than half the total income, and this
would not be time-consistent if the traditional man could renege once the educated woman is married to
him (and there is a non-trivial cost of divorce).
29 α0 is a level eﬀect, and hence does not aﬀect the threshold wage itself.
15An individual’s utility when single is deﬁned analogously.30
νi = max
0≤ti≤1
witi + βlog(1 − ti) (1.4)
The optimal time allocation is ti = 0 when wi ≤ β and ti = 1 −
β
wi when wi > β. I assume
that household production is valued such that Vm(wm,wU) ≥ νm (i.e. men prefer to marry
a housewife than to remain single).
1.3.3 Marriage Decision
Matching is done as a one-period random search in which the probability of meeting
another individual (of a diﬀerent sex) of type j is given by the fraction of type j in the
population.31 Hence the probability that a woman is matched to a modern type is λM and
the probability that she is matched with a traditional type is 1 − λM. Individuals decide
whether to stay in a match (that is, marry) and obtain utility Vij as in equations (1.2) and
(1.3) or to remain single and obtain utility νi as in equation (1.4). An individual i chooses
to marry j if and only if Vij ≥ νi holds.
Vm(wm,wU) ≥ νm implies that men marry educated women as well as uneducated women,
since Vm increases in wf. A woman’s marriage decision depends on her wage and the type of
man she is matched to. If matched to a modern type, she chooses to marry. But if matched
to a traditional type, she may prefer to remain single when her wage is suﬃciently high.
Given the disutility term, νf > VfT is possible as wf rises because the marginal return from
30 Alternatively, I can assume that the value of household production is smaller for unmarried agents
(i.e. smaller than β) if for instance, children are the main source of utility in household public goods and
unmarried agents do not have children. I keep the same β as in equations (1.2) and (1.3) to keep the algebra
as simple as possible.
31 Allowing individuals who are unmarried after the ﬁrst round to redraw does not make any diﬀerence in
the fraction and type of men and women who remain single, because only educated women and traditional
men would remain. A directed search model would yield a higher fraction of married agents in the population,
because modern men prefer educated women to uneducated women (Vm increases in wf). However, a directed
search model would require all women to correctly anticipate ex-ante what fraction of her contemporaries
would choose to become educated.
16one’s wage is higher when it is not shared with a spouse.
Denote the woman’s wage at which νf intersects with VfT as   wE. Depending on the
relative size of α0 and α1, I then get the following relationship between wE,   wE, and wm:
Proposition 1.
βlog2 < α0 + α1 <
1
2
(wm − wE) + βlog2 (1.5)
When α0 and α1 satisfy equation (1.5), wE <   wE < wm. When they are larger,   wE < wE <
wm. When they are smaller, wE < wm <   wE.
(The proof for this and all other propositions can be found in Appendix A.2.2.)
In words, if the disutility from having a traditional husband is too large, all educated
women will decide to stay single when matched to traditional men. On the other hand, if
the disutility is small, then all women will choose to marry even when they are matched
to traditional men. In the intermediate case where α0 and α1 satisfy equation (1.5), an
educated woman’s marriage decision changes as her outside option improves. I focus on this
last, non-trivial case. Assume that equation (1.5) holds and that α0 ≤ βlog2, so that α1 is
strictly larger than zero.
An implication of this search model is that when wE <   wE, women’s marriage probabil-
ities are invariant to the fraction of modern men in the marriage market because all women
choose to marry. Thus, uneducated women always marry. When wE ≥   wE, however, edu-
cated women matched to traditional types do not marry because νf > VfT. An educated
woman with a high enough wage need not tolerate a traditional husband for the sake of his
income.
Therefore, the expected marriage probability pi of uneducated (U) and educated (E)
women can be expressed as in equation (1.6), given that educated women randomly draw
17wages from W(.) with support (2β,wm).32

  
  
pU(λM) = 1
pE(λM) =
  e wE
2β 1dW +
  wm
e wE λMdW
(1.6)
Consequently, a woman’s expected utility conditional upon her educational attainment
can be expressed as:

  
  
VU(λM) = λMVUM + (1 − λM)VUT
VE(λM) =
  e wE
2β (λMVEM + (1 − λM)VET)dW +
  wm
e wE (λMVEM + (1 − λM)νf)dW
(1.7)
where Vfj and νf are as deﬁned in equations (1.3) and (1.4).
1.3.4 Education Decision
I assume that each woman faces an idiosyncratic eﬀort cost e of becoming educated,
where e is an iid random draw from a continuous cumulative distribution function G(.). Let
  e(λM) ≡ VE(λM) − VU(λM) (1.8)
be the expected utility diﬀerential between an educated and uneducated woman given the
fraction of modern men, λM. Because wages are exogenous,   e(λM) is independent of the
fraction of women who decide to become educated.33
  e(λM) has the following properties:
Proposition 2.   e(λM) is an increasing function of λM, and   e(λM) ≥ 0 always holds.
Since all women with eﬀort cost e ≤   e(λM) decide to invest in education, the equilibrium
32 See Appendix A.2.1 for a discussion on how wages may instead be proportionate to the eﬀort exerted
such that a greater e generates a better wage distribution.
33 I abstract from general equilibrium eﬀects on wages.
18λE(λM)—fraction of educated women—at any point in time is:
λE(λM) = G(  e(λM)) (1.9)
It follows directly from Proposition 2 that λE(λM) is also a continuous, increasing function
of λM on [0,1). λE = 1 (and therefore λM = 1) is ruled out, because e can be unboundedly
large. In words, more women ﬁnd it worthwhile to invest in education when there is a larger
fraction of modern men because marriage prospects are better. But it is never the case
that all women become educated because there are always a few whose cost of investing in
education is very high.
1.3.5 Shock to Women’s Wages and the Gold Miss Phenomenon
There are equal numbers of men and women in the society. Let the number of educated
women at period t be denoted as FEt:
FEt ≡ λEt(λMt)Ft (1.10)
where Ft is the total number of women at t. The conditional probability of being unmarried
when educated (being a Gold Miss), is simply 1 − pE(λMt) , where pE(λMt) is the marriage
probability of educated women as deﬁned in equation (1.6).
Wt(.) is the continuous cumulative distribution function of educated women’s wages in
generation t over support (2β,wm). The following comparative statics can be made with
regards to contemporaneous wages:
Proposition 3. Given Wt−1(.) and λMt−1, if the distribution Wt1(.) ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates Wt2(.), FEt1 ≥ FEt2.
Proposition 4. Given Wt−1(.) and λMt−1, educated women’s marriage probability is an
increasing function of Wt(  wE). Hence if the distribution Wt1(.) ﬁrst-order stochastically
19dominates Wt2(.), pEt1 ≤ pEt2.
That is, both the number of educated women and the probability that they remain un-
married are increasing in educated women’s current wages. Proposition 3 is straightforward;
more women are incentivized to invest in education when the returns to education are greater.
Proposition 4 results because women with wages higher than   wE can aﬀord to stay single
when matched to traditional men.
More important, however, is whether the probability of becoming a Gold Miss increases
or decreases as wages rise over time, i.e. pEt − pEt−1.34
Proposition 5. Suppose Wt(.) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates Wt−1(.) at all t. The
decrease in pE from t −1 to t is larger when (i) the drop in W(  wE) from t− 1 to t is larger
and (ii) the shift in W(.) from t − 2 to t − 1 is smaller.
That is, the Gold Miss phenomenon is more likely to arise in economies where there was a
large, one-time shock to women’s wages than in those that had a more gradual wage growth.
To understand why this is so, notice that wage increase aﬀects pE in two opposite di-
rections. First, there is the contemporaneous eﬀect: higher wages allow educated women
to remain single when matched to traditional type and thus lowers marriage probability
(Proposition 4). On the other hand, more women have an incentive to become educated
when wages are high (Proposition 3) and this generates a larger fraction of modern males in
the next generation. This intergenerational eﬀect raises educated women’s marriage prob-
ability by increasing the pool of marriageable men. The second eﬀect, unlike the ﬁrst, is
lagged.
Condition (i) in Proposition 5 enlarges the ﬁrst eﬀect whereas condition (ii) curtails the
second, resulting in the Gold Miss phenomenon. But if either of the conditions fail to hold,
the two opposing eﬀects come into play and pEt may fall only slightly relative to pEt−1, or
may even increase.
34 Since uneducated women always marry, pUt − pUt−1 = 0.
20In sum, the Gold Miss phenomenon should be best observed when there is a shock to
women’s wages in a country with a large fraction of traditional men. The key observation
is that the results do not depend on societies being endowed with diﬀerent types of men.
Even if all countries had equally traditional men at t = 1 and the same wage level at t = T,
mismatch in the marriage market would be a function of how rapidly the economy grew
between t = 1 and t = T. Therefore, similarly developed countries at t = T can have very
diﬀerent gender norms, which in turn dictates the variation in the degree of mismatch we
observe in the marriage market.
Finally, it is worth noting that this path dependency feature may result in prolonged
repercussions, well beyond the arising of the Gold Miss phenomenon. Countries may become
“stuck” in the Gold Miss equilibrium because as long as the Gold Misses do not have children,
they cannot contribute to producing a new cohort of modern males (equation (1.1)). But if
the fraction of modern men depends on the fraction of all educated women in the previous
cohort (regardless of marital status), then the fraction of modern men would increase greatly
after the Gold Miss generation.
1.4 Evidence on the Eﬀect of Cultural Transmission on the Gold Miss
Phenomenon
I focus my empirical exploration of the model on four testable implications. First, men
who grew up around highly educated women are less traditional than those who grew up
around less educated women. Second, husband’s type aﬀects household time allocation; a
woman is more likely to work in the labor market when her husband is a modern type.
Third, women marry less traditional men (rather than traditional) when they are available.
Fourth (and as a consequence of the prior points), the Gold Miss phenomenon is less severe
when there is a larger fraction of modern men in the marriage market.
The ideal way to test these predictions would be to exogenously vary wage growth paths
21or the composition of male types within an initially traditional country and then see how
the marriage market unfolds generations later. Because this is not feasible, I use three
diﬀerent datasets—the Japanese General Social Survey, the U.S. Census and the American
Community Survey, and the American Time Use Survey—to test the four elements above.
1.4.1 Gender Attitudes and Marriage Patterns in Japan
I ﬁrst analyze the Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS) to evaluate how a mother’s
education and employment aﬀect her son’s gender attitudes and marriage patterns in one of
the Gold Miss countries—Japan.
Data
The JGSS is designed to solicit political, sociological, and economic information from
men and women living in Japan and has been conducted seven times during the 2000s.35 I
pool these years for the analyses. The sample size is about 3,500 per year. Observations
are weighted to make the sample representative of the Japanese population.36 Respondents
younger than 25 or still attending school are excluded in order to obtain more accurate data
on ﬁnal education. Appendix Table A.1 contains descriptive statistics of the key variables.
Results
My model rests on the notion that gender norms are subject to change and that men’s
views of gender roles are inﬂuenced by their mothers. I investigate this using individual’s
responses to ﬁve questions in the JGSS speciﬁcally designed to capture gender attitudes.
Respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statements: “If
a husband has suﬃcient income, it is better for his wife not to have a job,” “Men should
cook and look after themselves,” “A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look
35 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008.
36 See Appendix A.1.3 for how the weights are constructed.
22after the home and family,” “A preschool child is likely to suﬀer if his/her mother works,”
and “It is more important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to have one herself.”
An individual can be deﬁned as less traditional if he/she agrees with the second statement,
and disagrees with the other statements.37
To investigate whether the mother-to-son transmission exists, I estimate the following
linear probability model:
Yist = β0 + β1Xist + β2MomLFPist + β3MomCollist + γt + δs + εist (1.11)
where the dependent variable Yist is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the response to
the speciﬁc question (listed above) is less traditional for a man i who lives in region s and
belongs to cohort t. MomLFPist equals 1 if his mother had a paying job when he was about
15 years old, and MomCollist equals 1 if his mother is a college graduate.38 Xist represents
a set of demographic controls such as respondent’s age, education, and income. In addition
to regional and urban dummies δs, I include cohort ﬁxed eﬀects γt to take into account time
trends.39
Table 1.1 contains the estimation results. The coeﬃcients on having had a working and
college graduate mother are always positive, and are statistically signiﬁcant in cols. 1, 3, and
4. The probability that a man disagrees with the statements “If a husband has suﬃcient
income, it is better for his wife not to have a job,” “A husband’s job is to earn money; a
37 Responses to these ﬁve statements diﬀer by sex and cohort. I ﬁnd that women are always less traditional
than men and the gap is larger in recent cohorts. Also, there has been a signiﬁcant evolution of beliefs for
both men and women over time. Those who were born after 1960 responded less traditionally to at least
one or two more statements compared with those born in the 1920s.
38 The JGSS asks “When you were about 15 years old, did your mother have any paying job? If so, what
did she do?” MomLFPist is zero for those who answered “She was not working.” Respondents who “Don’t
know” or did not have a mother at that time are excluded. MomCollist equals 1 for four-year colleges (not
junior college or college of technology).
39 There are 47 prefectures in Japan, which are governmental bodies larger than cities, towns, and villages.
The prefectures are grouped into six regions (“blocks”) in the JGSS. Urban is a set of three dummies for
the size of municipality—largest cities, other cities, and town/village. Largest cities are the “Cabinet-Order
designated cities” that have more than 500,000 people.
23wife’s job is to look after the home and family” and “A preschool child is likely to suﬀer if
his/her mother works” increases by about 5 percentage points if his mother worked relative
to if his mother did not work when he was young and by more than 10 percentage points if
his mother is a college graduate. These are comparable in magnitude to the marginal eﬀect
of the respondent himself being college graduate. Father’s educational attainment, on the
other hand, has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. The results are robust to restricting the
sample to currently married men.40
If men who had working and/or college graduate mothers are indeed less traditional, are
they more likely to be married than men who had housewife mothers? And are their wives
more likely to work after marriage?
To address these questions, in Table 1.2, I look at the correlation between a mother’s
background and her son’s marriage probability (cols. 1-2) and her daughter-in-law’s LFP
(cols. 3-4). Col. 1 shows that there is a small but positive relationship between a mother’s
LFP and her son’s marriage probability. To reduce the bias from potential correlations
between a mother’s work status and her son’s ability, and since the model focuses on the
case where men’s wages are higher than women’s, I run the regression for just the college
graduate men in col. 2. I ﬁnd that mother’s LFP has a larger positive eﬀect than when
all men are considered. As for mother’s educational attainment, the coeﬃcient is positive
although statistically insigniﬁcant. Thus, a man’s likelihood of marriage is higher if his
mother worked or is a college graduate.
Cols. 3-4 of Table 1.2 present the results from estimating equation (1.11) with wife’s cur-
rent labor force participation (measured by whether she had any paying job in the last week)
as the dependent variable. Having a college graduate mother does not have a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on wife’s probability of working. But a man having had a working mother
40 When I replicate this analysis for female respondents, I ﬁnd that both mother’s LFP and mother being
a college graduate do not have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on women’s gender attitudes. Consistent with
the model’s assumption, the intergenerational transmission of gender attitudes matters more for men than
women.
24Table 1.1: Eﬀect of Mother’s LFP and Education on Gender Attitudes, Men in Japan
Dependent variable=1 if less traditional
View on: Wife job Men housework Wife’s role Working mother Wife career
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mother’s LFP at age 15 0.064*** 0.019 0.043** 0.050*** 0.017
(0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Mother college graduate 0.145** 0.012 0.104* 0.211*** 0.080
(0.062) (0.039) (0.062) (0.054) (0.060)
Father college graduate -0.035 0.014 -0.025 -0.028 0.011
(0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
College graduate 0.074*** 0.057*** 0.105*** 0.051*** 0.104***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
ln(Income) 0.006 -0.015 -0.007 -0.028** -0.002
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Currently married 0.031 -0.045*** -0.006 0.024 0.076***
(0.024) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Control for age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural at age 15 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region and Urban FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,890 3,576 3,883 3,865 3,554
Dependent variable mean 0.49 0.83 0.48 0.50 0.57
Notes. Eﬀect of mother’s LFP and education on gender attitudes, among men in Japan. Data are from the 2000–2008
JGSS. See Appendix A.1.3 for details. Each column refers to the following statements, respectively: (1) “If a husband
has suﬃcient income, it is better for his wife not to have a job,” (2) “Men should cook and look after themselves,” (3)
“A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after the home and family,” (4) “A preschool child is likely to
suﬀer if his/her mother works,” and (5) “It is more important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to have one
herself.” The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent either “Disagree” or “Somewhat disagree” to the statements
(except for (2), where the dependent variable equals 1 if “Agree” or “Somewhat agree”). Mother’s LFP at age 15 equals
1 if mother had a paying job when respondent was about 15 years old. ln(Income) is the log of total personal income (in
1999 yen). Region is a set of six dummies, and urban is a set of three dummies for the size of municipality. Birth cohort
is grouped into six decennial periods, from 1920–1929 to 1970–1983. I exclude respondents under age 25 or enrolled in
school at the time of the survey. Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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5when he was young raises the probability that his wife works by about 6 percentage points.
When the sample is restricted to college graduate men, the eﬀect is 7.2 percentage points.
This is more than a 10 percent increase since the mean of married women’s LFP is about 50
percent.
Note that region, urban, and rural at age 15 dummies are included to control for regional
variation; places with female-dominated industries may bias the mere chance that both
mother and wife are employed. Wife’s LFP is negatively correlated with husband’s education,
income, and the total number of children in the household. It is positively correlated with
herself being college graduate. Using wife’s usual hours worked per week instead of her LFP
as the dependent variable yields similar results.41
Altogether, these results suggest that a mother’s work experience and educational attain-
ment aﬀect her son’s gender attitudes and marriage. Consistent with the model’s assumption
on intergenerational transmission, men who had working and college graduate mothers are
more likely to have egalitarian gender attitudes. The probability that a man ever marries
and that he has a working wife also increases with his mother’s LFP and education.
41 The coeﬃcient on mother’s LFP is 3.4 hours per week for all men and 4.1 hours per week when the
sample is restricted to college graduate men. They are both statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
26Table 1.2: Eﬀects of Mother’s LFP and Education, Men in Japan
Dependent variable=1 if ever married Dependent variable=1 if wife works
Men Over Age 35 Married Men
All College graduate All College graduate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother’s LFP at age 15 0.010 0.033* 0.060*** 0.072**
(0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.030)
Mother college graduate 0.038 0.029 0.070 0.064
(0.035) (0.041) (0.063) (0.069)
Father college graduate 0.018 0.024 -0.073** -0.038
(0.019) (0.023) (0.032) (0.037)
College graduate -0.008 0.000 -0.081*** 0.000
(0.012) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000)
ln(Income) 0.073*** 0.090*** -0.024* -0.084***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.024)
Wife college graduate 0.071** 0.055*
(0.029) (0.032)
No. of children under 19 -0.025** -0.039**
(0.010) (0.016)
Control for age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural at age 15 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region and Urban FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,767 1,252 3,798 1,302
Dependent variable mean 0.91 0.91 0.56 0.49
Notes. Eﬀect of mother’s LFP and education on probability ever married and wives’ LFP, among men in Japan. Data are
from the 2000–2008 JGSS. See Appendix A.1.3 for details. Mother’s LFP at age 15 equals 1 if mother had a paying job when
respondent was about 15 years old. ln(Income) is the log of total personal income (in 1999 yen). Controls for respondent’s
and wife’s (cols. 3-4 only) are included. Region is a set of six dummies, and urban is a set of three dummies for the size of
municipality. Birth cohort is grouped into six decennial periods, from 1920–1929 to 1970–1983. I exclude respondents under age
25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey. Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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71.4.2 Time Use of Married Asians in the U.S.
We have just seen that Asian men are tradition-bound but are less so when their mothers
are more educated and work outside the home. The supply of modern men in Asia is therefore
limited. What happens when educated Asian women live in areas with more modern men?
In this section, I explore time use of married Asians in the U.S. to see whether a husband’s
type—as proxied by his country of origin and U.S. nativity—aﬀect his and his wife’s time
spent on household chores.
Data
I use the 2003–2011 waves of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) to explore the
time spent by respondents (and their household members) on both market and non-market
activities. Using information on father’s birthplace, I restrict my sample to respondents from
the Gold Miss countries—Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.
For all analyses in this section, only married couples with spouse present are considered
since couples who are currently separated or divorced do not face the same constraints in
determining time allocation as couples living together. Couples with either respondent or
spouse under age 25 are excluded. In comparing across generations, I distinguish between
foreign born and second generation.42 Appendix Table A.2 contains the summary statistics
of my sample.
Results
There are several ways to group non-market activities. I have chosen to use “core non-
market work” in Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008), which includes activities such as food
42 All foreign born immigrants are categorized as foreign born regardless of their age at migration. There
are no respondents who are foreign born yet with a U.S. born father in the sample, reducing the possibility
of bias from adoptees. I also do not exclude those who have migrated to the U.S. as adults because unlike
education and marriage decisions in Section 1.4.3 below, time use at home within married couples is an
everyday practice, and thus is not contingent on the decisions made before coming to the U.S. Second
generation is U.S. born respondents whose fathers are foreign born.
28preparation, indoor cleaning, and washing/drying clothes. Time spent on shopping, and
other home production such as home maintenance, outdoor cleaning, vehicle repair, garden-
ing, and pet care are excluded, as well as time spent on child care, medical care, education,
and restaurant meals. Throughout, I refer to “core non-market work” as housework.43
According to the model, U.S. born Asian men are more likely to be modern type than
foreign born Asian men because they have been exposed to U.S. gender norms and fami-
lies from childhood. I estimate the following equation to investigate the eﬀect of cultural
background on men’s housework hours:
Yist = β0 + β1Xist + β2U.S.bornist + γt + δs + εist (1.12)
where the Xist are demographic controls such as age, education, usual work hours, the number
of children in household, and the age of the youngest child in household. γt and δs are year
and state ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively.44 The variable U.S.bornist equals 1 if the respondent is
U.S. born and 0 if foreign born. Standard errors are clustered by father’s birthplace.
Table 1.3 presents the estimates from the OLS regression. Despite the small sample size,
the coeﬃcient on U.S. born is large and highly signiﬁcant. Relative to foreign born, Asian
American men spend about four hours more on housework when the couple’s demographics
and working hours are considered (cols. 1 and 2) and 2.5 hours more when the number and
age of children are considered as well (col. 3).45
Thus, U.S. born husbands spend more time on housework than traditional foreign born
husbands, taking into account couple’s demographics, working hours, and children. However,
43 All ﬁndings are robust to using a broader deﬁnition that includes other home production activities, such
as “total non-market work” in Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008).
44 Usual work hours are only available for individuals who are employed. I recode the variable to zero for
those currently unemployed. Individuals who responded “hours vary” are excluded from the analyses. Race
has 21 categories and includes multiple-race in addition to all major single race classiﬁcations.
45 Hwang (2013b) obtains similar results for men from countries with low female labor force participation
(FLFP) rates in general. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. born eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant when the sample
is restricted to men from countries with FLFP rates as high as that of the U.S.
29Table 1.3: Assimilation of Housework Time, Men from Gold Miss Countries
Dependent variable: Man’s housework time (hours per week)
(1) (2) (3)
U.S. born 4.022*** 4.246*** 2.471**
(0.706) (1.204) (1.154)
Age -0.220*** -0.300*** -0.194*
(0.077) (0.062) (0.104)
College graduate -4.094*** -4.560** -3.221***
(1.147) (1.772) (1.225)
Wife’s age 0.373*** 0.392*** 0.320**
(0.071) (0.062) (0.135)
Wife college graduate 1.946** 2.057** 2.712**
(0.887) (0.877) (1.322)
ln(Family income) 0.913* 0.330 0.493
(0.497) (0.435) (0.383)
Usual work hours -0.019 -0.007
(0.013) (0.009)
Wife’s usual work hours 0.071*** 0.079***
(0.017) (0.013)
No. of children under 18 -0.258
(0.497)
Age of youngest child in household -0.106**
(0.045)
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N 131 116 80
Dependent variable mean 3.14 3.30 1.93
Notes. Eﬀect of being U.S. born on housework hours, among married men whose father’s birthplace is Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, or Taiwan. Data are from the 2003–2011 ATUS. See Appendix A.1.4 for
details. ln(Family income) is the log of family income (in 1999 dollars). I exclude respondents under age
25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey. Standard errors are clustered by father’s birthplace. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
30given that men earn higher wages than women in most families, the important distinction
between modern and traditional type males may not be in their own housework hours but
in how much they want the housework to be done by their wives. The model predicts that
a woman married to a traditional husband does more housework than a woman married to
a modern one, ceteris paribus.
Therefore, I investigate the eﬀect of husband’s cultural background on wife’s housework
hours, where I use female labor force participation (FLFP) rates in father’s birthplace to
divide countries into traditional and less traditional groups.46 The United Nations (UN)
provides data (from the International Labor Organization) on women’s share of labor force
in 187 countries starting from 1985. To focus on adult women’s LFP and to obtain statistics
for as many countries as possible, I use the FLFP rate of the 25–34 age group. I also use the
oldest data available, 1985, to better reﬂect the gender norms that immigrants were exposed
to before migrating to the U.S.
I deﬁne high (low) FLFP countries as countries where women’s LFP rates in 1985 were
higher (lower) than that of the U.S.—70.9 percent. U.S. is used as the standard since the
shift in gender norms that immigrants experience derives from the contrast between their
country of origin and the U.S. A total of 121 countries in the UN data are matched to
father’s birthplace in the ATUS sample, of which 42 countries are high FLFP and 79 are low
FLFP. (See Appendix Figure A.1 for a map of the countries by category.) The Gold Miss
countries all belong to the low FLFP category.
The regression is similar to equation (1.12) but with husband’s background as the key
covariates, and standard errors clustered by husband’s father’s birthplace. Table 1.4 contains
the estimation results. The size of the coeﬃcients are large: husband’s country of origin
and U.S. nativity have marginal eﬀects of more than ﬁve hours per week when considered
46 I can alternatively use mother’s birthplace and the results are similar (95 percent of respondents have
parents born in the same country). FLFP is commonly used in the political economy literature as an indicator
of a country’s family culture and women’s economic status. See for example, Alesina and Giuliano (2010)
and Fern´ andez and Fogli (2009). For my purposes, married women’s LFP rates would be ideal, but they are
not available in cross-country datasets.
31Table 1.4: Eﬀect of Husband’s Country of Origin and U.S. Nativity on Housework Time, Women
from Gold Miss Countries
Dependent variable: Woman’s housework time (hours per week)
(1) (2) (3)
Husband low FLFP origin 5.983** 4.260*
(2.446) (2.544)
Husband U.S. born -5.430** -3.625
(2.145) (2.833)
U.S. born -1.611 -2.994 -1.110
(2.661) (2.856) (2.543)
Usual work hours -0.146*** -0.095*** -0.146***
(0.051) (0.032) (0.051)
Husband’s usual work hours 0.215*** 0.119 0.202***
(0.073) (0.086) (0.067)
ln(Family income) -4.736*** -3.777** -4.849***
(1.596) (1.779) (1.545)
No. of children under 18 3.854*** 2.817** 3.651**
(1.459) (1.413) (1.407)
Age of youngest child in household 0.381 -0.301 0.230
(0.278) (0.279) (0.388)
Control for age, educ Yes Yes Yes
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N 95 106 95
Dependent variable mean 16.88 16.51 16.88
Notes. Eﬀect of husband’s country of origin and U.S. nativity on housework time, among married women
whose father’s birthplace is Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, or Taiwan. Data are from 2003–2011
ATUS. See Appendix A.1.4 for details. ln(Family income) is the log of family income (in 1999 dollars).
Controls for both respondent’s and husband’s age and whether college graduate are included. I exclude
respondents under age 25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey. Standard errors are clustered by
husband’s father’s birthplace. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
separately (cols. 1 and 2). When both are included as covariates in col. 3, the average
housework time of Asian women married to men from high FLFP countries is about four
hours less than those married to men from low FLFP countries. The magnitude translates
into more than a 25 percent drop in married women’s housework time.47
These results are consistent with the prediction that variation in housework hours of
married women can be partly attributed to husbands’ cultural backgrounds. The type of
47 I obtain similar results when I use the actual FLFP rate in the husband’s father’s birthplace instead of
the dichotomous distinction of high and low FLFP origins.
32men matters not so much because men do the housework but because they do not mind their
wives’ doing less and outsourcing more.
Furthermore, the ﬁndings above imply that cross-country diﬀerences in the substitutabil-
ity between household production and market goods cannot be the main determinant of the
Gold Miss phenomenon. As mentioned in Section 1.2, not only are the relative prices of
outsourcing housework in the U.S. and East Asia similar, but as shown here, there is a wide
cultural variation in household time allocations even among those living in the same country.
1.4.3 Marriage Patterns of Koreans and Japanese in the U.S.
My research and others suggest that immigrants are culturally similar to those in their
home countries and U.S. born men are less traditional than Asian born men.48 Thus, immi-
gration from the Gold Miss countries to the U.S. can demonstrate how the marriage market
equilibrium would change when more modern males become available in Asia. I use the U.S.
census data to examine whether the Gold Miss phenomenon similarly exists among Koreans
and Japanese in the U.S., and if not, whom the women are marrying in the U.S.
Data
I use the 1980, 1990, 2000 Census and the 2001 to 2010 American Community Survey
(ACS) IPUMS ﬁles.49 A respondent is deﬁned as Korean or Japanese if categorized as
“Korean” or “Japanese” in the single race variable.50 (Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Singapore is
not recognized as single race categories. They are grouped as “Other Asian” or “Chinese.”)
48 See footnote 8 for references on U.S. immigrants’ cultural and economic assimilation.
49 The Census and the ACS are the only datasets that have suﬃciently large sample size to study the
Koreans and Japanese in the U.S.
50 The Census and ACS collect parent’s birthplace only for respondents who live with their parents at
the time of the survey (less than 5 percent of the adult population). Single race is assigned according
to respondent’s self-reported race in the survey and is comparable across all years and is available for all
respondents (including those with multiple-race). Individuals with multiple-race are assigned to the single
race category deemed most likely. However, multiple-race is extremely rare among Koreans and Japanese:
99 percent of Koreans and 98 percent of Japanese self-reported themselves as “Korean” or “Japanese” in
the detailed race question (and not “Korean and White” or “Japanese and White,” for instance).
33Individuals younger than 25 or still attending school are excluded.
I distinguish between ﬁrst and higher generations of immigrants. Because immigrants
may have chosen to come to the U.S. after completing their ﬁnal education in their home
countries or getting married, bringing their spouses with them, I only use respondents who
immigrated to the U.S. when they were younger than 18 years old. I also exclude respondents
who migrated before three years old to limit the bias from including Korean and Japanese
adoptees.51 Foreign born in this section refers to immigrants who came to the U.S. between
ages 3 and 17. Second and higher generations are grouped as U.S. born.52
Appendix Table A.3 reports the descriptive statistics of my sample. Foreign born are
comprised of fewer Japanese because the wave of immigration from Korea has been more
recent. Hence, I control for respondent’s ethnicity in all my analyses.
Results
The percentage of four-year college graduates among Korean and Japanese women in-
creased from less than 20 percent in the 1930s birth cohort to more than 60 percent in the
1980s birth cohort. Although there were more male college graduates in the early cohorts,
the increase was more gradual for men, resulting in a switch in the educational gender gap.53
Hence, the Gold Miss phenomenon among Koreans and Japanese who immigrated to the
U.S. may well be more severe because the sex ratio among college graduates in the U.S. is less
51 See Appendix A.1.5 for how age at migration is calculated. Adoptees may be identiﬁed as Korean or
Japanese in the Census despite having been brought up by American parents and not having any cultural
connections to Korea or Japan. According to the Intercountry Adoption statistics from the U.S. Department
of State, 99 percent of adoptees from Korea and Japan in 1999–2011 arrived in the U.S. when they were
younger than three years old. The Holt International Children’s Services data in Sacerdote (2007) also shows
similar ﬁgures for Korean adoptees placed during 1964–1985: 91.4 percent of children arrived under the age
of three.
52 It is impossible to distinguish between these generations without information on parent’s birthplace.
Since the immigration wave from East Asia began in the 1960s (after the Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1965), however, third or higher generations are expected to comprise a small fraction of my
sample. Naturalized citizens are categorized as foreign born.
53 The overall development across time is similar for the foreign born and the U.S. born. The fraction
college graduate is larger among Koreans and Japanese in the U.S. than among white Americans (less than
40 percent).
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Figure 1.4: Diﬀerence in Fraction Ever Married Between College Graduates and Non-College Grad-
uates, Koreans and Japanese Over Age 35 in the U.S.
Notes. Diﬀerence in the fraction ever married between college graduates and non-college graduates, among
Koreans and Japanese in the U.S. over age 35 in each birth cohort. Data are from the 1980, 1990, 2000
Census and 2001–2010 ACS. I exclude respondents who have migrated to the U.S. under age 3 or over 17,
or still attending school at the time of the survey.
in favor of women than in Korea and Japan, where there are more male than female college
graduates. However, Figure 1.4 shows that college graduate Koreans and Japanese are as
likely to be married as the non-college graduates. For both sexes, the fraction married among
college graduates relative to non-college graduates has been increasing across cohorts, and
the diﬀerence switched from negative to positive for women. This contrasts starkly with the
downward trend found in Asia and is instead similar to the trend observed among Americans
overall (see Figure 1.3). That is, the Gold Miss phenomenon does not hold in the U.S.
Because women’s educational attainment, labor force participation, and wages increased
35decades earlier in the U.S. than in Asia, men who grew up in the U.S. have less traditional
gender attitudes than those who grew up in Korea or Japan. College graduate women would
then have greater options in the U.S. marriage market than in Korea or Japan.
This notion appears to have much validity. Among the college graduate and foreign born
Koreans and Japanese, women are much more likely than men to have a spouse who is
neither Korean nor Japanese (Table 1.5 Panels A and B, row 1). The gender gap is large:
one third of these women married U.S. born who are not Korean or Japanese while only 16
percent of men did, and about half of the women married foreign born Korean or Japanese
while more than 70 percent of men did.
The gender gap in spouse’s ethnicity is smaller among the U.S. born Koreans and
Japanese (Panels A and B, row 2). The incidence of having a foreign born Korean or
Japanese spouse falls to 6 percent for women and 12.5 percent for men. The vast majority
of both sexes marry U.S. born—89 percent of women and 81 percent of men—although men
tend to marry Korean or Japanese Americans while women tend to marry Americans who
do not identify themselves as Korean or Japanese (mostly white Americans).54
These ﬁndings suggest that Korean and Japanese men and women have diﬀerent pref-
erences for their spouse’s ethnicity and U.S. nativity. Korean and Japanese men (particu-
larly the foreign born) usually marry Korean or Japanese immigrants whereas Korean and
Japanese women (even those who are foreign born) marry Americans.
To test whether women’s inclination to marry out of their ethnic group can be explained
by the Korean and Japanese men being more traditional than American men, I exploit
regional variation in the composition of the Korean and Japanese male population. That is,
for each state-cohort cell (six decennial birth cohorts and 51 states, including the District
of Columbia), I calculate the fraction foreign born among Korean and Japanese men—
number of foreign born Korean and Japanese men divided by the total number of Korean
54 The diﬀerential marriage pattern by respondent’s sex and U.S. nativity are robust to including respon-
dent’s age, education, ethnicity, and state and cohort ﬁxed eﬀects.
36Table 1.5: Spouse’s Ethnicity and U.S. Nativity, College Graduate Koreans and Japanese in the
U.S.
Panel A: Husband is:
KrJp KrJp Not KrJp Not KrJp Total
Foreign born U.S. born Foreign born U.S. born
Woman is:
Foreign born KrJp 0.526 0.063 0.067 0.344 1.000
U.S. born KrJp 0.058 0.409 0.044 0.488 1.000
Total 0.187 0.314 0.051 0.449 1.000
Panel B: Wife is:
KrJp KrJp Not KrJp Not KrJp Total
Foreign born U.S. born Foreign born U.S. born
Man is:
Foreign born KrJp 0.722 0.068 0.052 0.159 1.000
U.S. born KrJp 0.125 0.452 0.068 0.355 1.000
Total 0.287 0.348 0.063 0.302 1.000
Notes. Fraction of spouses in each ethnicity and nativity group, among college graduate and married
Koreans and Japanese (KrJp) in the U.S. Data are from the 1980, 1990, 2000 Census and 2001–2010 ACS.
Foreign born spouse refers to non-U.S. born regardless of spouse’s age at migration. Foreign born respondent
only includes those who migrated to the U.S. between ages 3–17. I exclude respondents under age 25 or still
attending school at the time of the survey.
and Japanese men. A larger share means that there are more foreign born than U.S. born
among the Korean and Japanese men in respondent’s state-cohort.55
The estimating equation is the following linear probability model:
Yist = β0 + β1Xist + β2fracfbst + β3totalst + γt + δs + εist (1.13)
where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if husband is not Korean
or Japanese and 0 otherwise. The key covariates fracfbst and totalst are, respectively, the
fraction foreign born among Koreans and Japanese men and the total number of Koreans and
Japanese men in the respondent’s state s and cohort t.56 The usual demographic controls
55 Pooling all state-cohort cells, the fraction foreign born among Korean and Japanese men ranges from 0
to 1 and has mean of 0.51 and standard deviation of 0.29. Hawaii and Idaho have low fraction foreign born
whereas New Jersey and New York have high fraction foreign born among Korean and Japanese men.
56 State here refers to the state of current residence. Note that state of birth cannot be used because of
the foreign born group.
37are included. Cohort ﬁxed eﬀects absorb common time trends that may exist with regards
to immigration from Asia or discrimination against interracial marriage. State ﬁxed eﬀects
control for diﬀerences across states such as the type of industries and racial composition.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-cohort level.
Table 1.6 presents the result of estimating equation (1.13) separately by education and
U.S. nativity of Korean and Japanese women. The positive coeﬃcient on fraction foreign
born among Korean and Japanese men shows that the probability a Korean or Japanese
woman marries out of her ethnic group increases when there are fewer U.S. born among
the Korean and Japanese men in her state-cohort. Moreover, consistent with the model’s
assumption that the disutility from having a traditional husband is greater for educated
women than for uneducated women, the coeﬃcient is larger in magnitude for college women
(cols. 1 and 2) than for non-college women (cols. 3 and 4).
The results are not driven by diﬀerences in the chance of meeting a Korean or Japanese
of the opposite sex or the competition between Koreans and Japanese of the same sex in
the marriage market; I control for both the total number of Korean and Japanese men and
women in the respondent’s state and cohort and also the fraction foreign born within the
female population. The ﬁndings imply a causal relationship between a Korean or Japanese
woman’s decision to marry outside her ethnic group and the composition of men in her own
ethnic group.57
One potential concern with the interpretation that Korean and Japanese women marry
American men because they are modern is that American men might marry Korean and
Japanese women expecting them to be obedient housewives. Another is that Korean and
Japanese women might marry American men to “marry-up” in socioeconomic status. How-
ever, I ﬁnd that Korean and Japanese women’s probability of working after marriage is
57 Repeating the analysis for Korean and Japanese men shows that the fraction foreign born among the
Korean and Japanese women in respondent’s state and cohort does not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
That is, Korean and Japanese men’s preference for Asian wives do not respond sensitively to the composition
of the female population.
38Table 1.6: Eﬀect of Korean and Japanese Male Composition on Husband’s Ethnicity, Korean and Japanese Women in
the U.S.
Dependent variable=1 if husband is not Korean or Japanese
College graduate KrJp women Non-college graduate KrJp women
Foreign born U.S. born Foreign born U.S. born
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction foreign born, KrJp men 0.742*** 0.573*** 0.150 0.528***
(0.222) (0.127) (0.252) (0.121)
ln(Total number of KrJp men) -0.259* 0.007 0.003 -0.106**
(0.135) (0.067) (0.068) (0.052)
Fraction foreign born, KrJp women -0.119 0.261 -0.021 0.281
(0.276) (0.191) (0.377) (0.174)
ln(Total number of KrJp women) 0.010 0.031 -0.276** 0.156**
(0.140) (0.084) (0.108) (0.075)
Husband college graduate -0.037 -0.035** 0.024 -0.049***
(0.036) (0.017) (0.028) (0.018)
Control for age, ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,965 10,817 2,414 14,108
Dependent variable mean 0.41 0.53 0.46 0.41
Notes. Eﬀect of fraction foreign born among Korean and Japanese (KrJp) men in one’s state and cohort on husband’s ethnicity,
among married Korean and Japanese women in the U.S. Data are from the 1980, 1990, 2000 Census and 2001–2010 ACS. Fraction
foreign born among men (women) is the number of foreign born (regardless of age at migration) divided by the number of Korean
and Japanese men (women) by state and cohort. State-cohort cells with no Korean or Japanese men (women) are excluded. ln(Total
number of KrJp) is the log of the total number of Korean and Japanese men (women) by state and cohort. Controls for both
respondent’s and husband’s age are included. Birth cohort is grouped into six decennial periods, from 1925–1934 to 1975–1985. I
exclude respondents who have migrated to the U.S. under age 3 or over 17, who are under age 25, or still attending school at the
time of the survey. Standard errors are clustered by state and cohort. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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9higher when the husband is not Korean or Japanese (see Appendix Table A.4).58 Moreover,
non-Asian husbands do not have higher educational attainment than their wives relative to
Asian husbands (see Appendix Table A.5).59
In summary, female Korean and Japanese college graduates in the U.S. are as likely to be
married as are non-college graduates. In terms of spouse’s type, Korean and Japanese women
in the U.S. are much more likely to marry Americans than their male peers, particularly
when the fraction of ﬁrst generation immigrants is large within the Korean and Japanese
male population. Korean and Japanese women’s LFP after marriage and their education
levels relative to their husbands’ suggest that the observed marriage patterns are not driven
by the selection of American men who want housewives or the marrying-up of Asian women.
1.5 Conclusion
The “East Asian tigers” transformed into developed economies in less than 50 years.
Today, women’s educational attainment and labor market performance in this region have
become comparable to, or even surpassed those of other developed countries. In contrast
to the U.S., however, marriage rates of college graduate women in Asia have become lower
relative to that of non-college graduate women. The low marriage rates of college educated
Asian women has been termed the “Gold Miss” phenomenon.
I argue that the Gold Miss phenomenon arises in traditional societies that underwent
rapid growth in women’s wages. Rapid improvement in women’s economic status creates
a gap between the women’s role that men grew up observing and the role that the new
generation of educated women choose to take. I test my hypothesis using data from Japan
and the U.S. In Japan, I ﬁnd that a mother’s working status and educational attainment are
positively correlated with her son’s gender attitudes and his likelihood of having a working
58 Using alternative deﬁnitions of work status, such as usual hours worked per week, yields similar results.
59 Using the National Latino and Asian American Survey, Chen and Takeuchi (2011) similarly ﬁnd that
Asian women in the U.S. who marry non-Asians are not marrying-up in terms of education or occupation
status.
40wife. In the U.S. time use data, I ﬁnd that husbands from countries with low female labor
force participation rates, like the Gold Miss countries, increase wives’ housework burden. Fi-
nally, women from Korea and Japan—two major Gold Miss countries—have greater options
in the U.S. marriage market because they can marry American men instead of Korean and
Japanese men. Indeed, in the U.S., Korean and Japanese college women are as likely to be
married as non-college women.
Overall, this paper provides an explanation for why the Gold Miss phenomenon arose
in developed Asian countries and also identiﬁes the driving forces behind the evolution of
educated women’s economic and household role.
412. The Design of Reforms with Time-Inconsistent Voters1
2.1 Introduction
It has been widely known for over a decade that the social security system not only in
the U.S. but in many countries must change in order to assure sustainability. Similarly,
there is widespread knowledge about environmental problems, but only small, gradual steps
have been taken to solve them. In this paper, we theoretically investigate why eﬃciency-
enhancing political reforms are often delayed, and why when a reform does begin, it is often
implemented gradually even though it would be more eﬃcient to carry it out at once.
The source of delay and gradualism that we propose is that voters are time-inconsistent,
i.e., they value utility in the present disproportionately higher than the same utility at
any period in the future.2 We investigate the consequences of such time-inconsistency of
the voters when policies have costs and beneﬁts that accrue over time, and the decision that
agents have to make is when to start a reform and how to spread out these costs and beneﬁts.
We ﬁrst present a benchmark model in which a patient agenda-setting politician is ex-
ogenously given. Then using a citizen candidate framework, we explore the case in which the
agenda setter is endogenously determined by voters. The model shows that gradualism may
be welfare-enhancing relative to big bang even though it cannot exploit complementarities
in reform packages. That is, gradualism is ineﬃcient compared to the ﬁrst-best situation
where the reform is carried out at once at the optimal point in time. However, welfare may
be higher than when gradualism is not an alternative, because otherwise the reform would
1 This is joint work with Johanna Mollerstrom.
2 See Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997).
42have been undertaken at an even later point, or not at all. We also ﬁnd that sophisticated
agents would elect an agenda setter who is more patient than the median voter in order to
commit to gradualism (and avoid procrastination).
This paper is closely related to the literature that began to ﬂourish when the Soviet
bloc collapsed and a large number of formerly planned economies faced the question about
whether, and how, to transition to a market economy. Most of the earlier papers were
speciﬁcally aimed at studying this particular transition.3
Two camps emerged in the debate on gradualism versus big bang. Proponents of the
big bang approach emphasize the complementarity of reform packages (Lipton and Sachs,
1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992). On the other hand, gradualism is shown to
arise in equilibrium when there is substantial heterogeneity in the payoﬀs people receive
from the reform (Wei, 1993) or when there is uncertainty about the outcome of the reform
(Dewatripont and Roland, 1992). In these cases, gradualism may help build political alliances
in support of the reform or provide information about whether or not a reform is worth
implementing at all.
Relatedly, there are papers that focus on the question of delay rather than gradualism.
Here, political concerns are often a key ingredient in models: incumbents want to avoid
initiating costly reforms during their terms in order to get re-elected. Reforms are even
more diﬃcult to carry out when interest groups or ﬁrms providing campaign funds lobby
against them (Brock and Magee, 1978; Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Alesina and Drazen
(1991) discuss how stabilization can be delayed as a result of a war of attrition between
diﬀerent socioeconomic groups.
However, some policies do not necessarily fall into the contexts mentioned above and yet
gradualism is still contemplated as a political alternative. In order to understand why this
is so, we present a model where both delay and gradualism may arise even in the absence of
heterogeneity in payoﬀs, uncertainty, and political concerns for re-election.
3 See Roland (2000) for an overview of the literature.
43Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it is one of the
ﬁrst attempts to apply the ﬁndings in behavioral economics to political economy, by intro-
ducing present-biased preferences into a model of political reform.4 Second, our model is
more generally applicable than the models that are structured around the speciﬁc historic
example of transitional economies. In fact, our model can have implications for any policies
with an inter-temporal nature. Third, the results of this paper allow us to diﬀerentiate be-
tween reforms that can beneﬁt from gradualism and those that cannot. Hence, it provides
normative guidelines as well as a positive analysis of the gradualist approach.
Lastly, this paper is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst paper to explicitly incorporate the election
of an agenda setter into the reform model. In previous work, a benevolent social planner
or a reform-minded government is given and the focus is on how to schedule the reforms
thereafter. This has been a common assumption in the literature but a major caveat when
it comes to understanding how reforms are actually designed, because the objective of the
policy maker is critical in determining the equilibrium strategy.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2.2, we present the benchmark model
with an exogenously given patient agenda setter. In Section 2.3, we endogenize the agenda
setter using a citizen candidate framework. Section 2.4 discusses potential applications of
our model. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Benchmark Model with Exogenous Agenda Setter
2.2.1 Setup
Our model is populated by agents who have present-biased preferences: a bias for the
present over the future. We adopt the hyperbolic discounting framework to capture this bias
(Laibson, 1997). When ut is a person’s instantaneous utility in period t and Ut(ut,ut+1,...uT)
4 Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2011) is, to our knowledge, the only other paper which explores the con-
sequences of time-inconsistent voters in relation to political reform. Their paper, however, is not about
assessing gradualism and big bang but about explaining the consumption-savings problem.
44is a person’s intertemporal preferences from the perspective of period t, hyperbolic discount-
ing can be represented by:
U
t(ut,ut+1,...uT) = δ
tut + β
T  
τ=t+1
δτuτ (2.1)
for all t.
The exponential, time-consistent discount factor is denoted as 0 < δ ≤ 1 while the
hyperbolic discount factor, representing the bias for the present, is denoted as 0 < β ≤ 1.
Note that if β = 1, equation (2.1) collapses to standard exponential discounting. In our
model, agents are heterogeneous in their β such that some are more “patient” (have β closer
to 1) than others. Let 0 < βM < 1 be the median voter’s β.
At each time period, agents must decide whether to start the reform or not, and whether
to perform the reform as a big bang or gradually. Consider the simple case of having three
time periods, t = 1,2,3. Following the notations in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), let
c = (c1,c2) be the cost schedule and v = (v1,v2) be the beneﬁt schedule. If the society agrees
to implement the reform as a big bang in period t, agents receive vt but incurs cost ct. If the
reform is not carried out until t = 2, it must be implemented then. That is, the status quo
is unsustainable and a reform will be impossible to avoid sooner or later. Hence, there are
two big bang options: at t = 1 (BB1) and at t = 2 (BB2).5
Gradualism is deﬁned as a reform that is implemented across t = 1,2 by shifting a
fraction (0 < α < 1) of the cost (or beneﬁt) to a later (or earlier) time period. For example,
agents borrow against future beneﬁts or receive subsidies for undertaking the change. Unlike
papers that imposes a more restrictive deﬁnition of gradualism, we allow the fraction α to
be endogenously determined within the model.6 That is, gradualism need not take the form
5 Because we will be discussing reforms where beneﬁts come a period later than the costs, BB3 is not an
option.
6 For example, in Wei (1993), gradualism is deﬁned as removing tariﬀs in two steps: lifting tariﬀs on good
x and then on good y. In Dewatripont and Roland (1995), gradualism is about trying “reform 1” for one
period and then deciding whether to try “reform 2” as well.
45of an equal split across time periods. We denote gradualism with a shifting parameter of α
as GR(α).
However, the ﬂexibility of gradualism comes at a cost. Compared to big bang, it is
inherently ineﬃcient because complementarities between diﬀerent parts of the reform package
cannot be exploited and extra administrative work or potential distortions may arise from
manipulating the payoﬀ stream.7 Let x represent the loss from gradualism. For example, if
a fraction of the cost, αc1, is shifted from t = 1 to t = 2, an extra cost of xαc1 is incurred in
addition to c1.
Social welfare is deﬁned as the utility of an agent with β = 1 at a hypothetical t = 0.
That is, we stay close to the welfare deﬁnition of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) which is
centered around what an agent, if fully informed, would like to do when planning her future
actions. Our welfare deﬁnition is also related to the psychological distinction of a “hot”
and “cold” state of mind, where the “hot” state is the decisions made under the inﬂuence of
short-term emotions whereas the “cold” state is the planning stage where long-term decisions
are made without inﬂuence of short-term emotions. Social welfare is then deﬁned by the
more rational decisions made in the “cold” state (Loewenstein, 2000).
Given this setup, the society must agree on a reform schedule. The agenda setter (AS)
proposes the alternatives to put to vote, and the reform schedule that wins under majority
ruling is implemented. In this section, we assume that an agenda setter with time-consistent
preferences (βAS = 1) is exogenously given. As a result, the agenda setter is comparable to
a benevolent social planner in that maximizing her utility would coincide with maximizing
social welfare. Note that she is not a dictator, however, as she cannot impose a reform
schedule on the people.
Below we solve the benchmark model for reforms with immediate costs. At the end of
7 Complementarity of reform packages is a common reason for supporting the big bang approach. See for
example, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Lipton and Sachs (1990). Those who favor gradualism
also acknowledge the eﬃciency cost tied to partial reforms. See for example, Dewatripont and Roland (1995)
and Wei (1993).
46the section, we also brieﬂy discuss the implications of the model for reforms with immediate
beneﬁts and reforms with no time lags in costs and beneﬁts.8 For simplicity, we assume δ = 1
throughout to focus on the intertemporal trade-oﬀs that arise from present-biasedness.9
2.2.2 Reforms with Immediate Costs
Reforms with immediate costs refer to those with costs that are incurred today whereas
beneﬁts are realized later in time. Most policies, in fact, fall into this category as they
are some sort of investments for the future. For example, the rewards of environmental
policies can only be enjoyed periods after the actual costs of the reform are incurred by the
population. Procrastination is costly, however, since the environment would only become
more polluted if no action is taken. (See Section 2.4 for further discussion.)
The beneﬁt from the reform is constant whether the reform is implemented in period 1 or
2 (v1 = v2 = v), whereas the cost increases with time (c1 < c2). As in (2.1), the intertemporal
utility from the reform for an agent living in period t = 1 can thus be expressed as:

      
      
U1(BB1) = −c1 + βv
U1(GR) = −(1 − α)c1 − xαc1 + β(v − αc1)
U1(BB2) = β(−c2 + v)
(2.2)
The beneﬁt is realized at t = 2, and hence is always discounted by β. When the reform is
done gradually, only (1 − α) of the costs are incurred today and the rest, αc1, is shifted to
tomorrow.10 As discussed above, gradualism accompanies a loss in eﬃciency proportionate
to the distortion imposed, xαc1.
The agenda setter’s problem is to maximize her own utility from the reform (which is
equal to social welfare) knowing that what she puts to vote must satisfy majority ruling.
8 The terms “immediate costs” and “immediate beneﬁts” are introduced in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
9 All results can be generalized to δ < 1. The earlier version of this paper solves the model with δ < 1.
10 Deﬁning gradualism like this, or as the fraction of beneﬁts moving closer in time yields identical results.
47Clearly, if she was not subject to any political constraints, she would choose BB1. With
costs increasing with time, the ﬁrst-best is to carry out the reform as soon as possible.
However, the agenda setter in our model must take into account the preferences of the
population. We concentrate on the case where βMc2 < c1 < c2: costs increase over time
but the increment is not so large as to make the median voter prefer BB1 to further delay.11
Then the agenda setter cannot propose BB1 because she knows it would be rejected by the
majority of the voters.12 They would rather have the default schedule of BB2.
Would the agenda setter propose gradualism instead? She will do so only if the following
two conditions hold: ﬁrst, gradualism provides higher social welfare than BB2 and second,
gradualism can win majority vote over BB2. If the ﬁrst condition is not met, the agenda
setter does not have any incentive to suggest gradualism since it is the worst option. If the
second condition is not met, even if she proposes, she will not be able to implement it.
Plugging in βAS = 1 to equation (2.2) we get the agenda setter’s U1, which equals social
welfare (SW) from each reform schedule:

      
      
SW(BB1) = −c1 + v
SW(GR) = −c1 − xαc1 + v
SW(BB2) = −c2 + v
(2.3)
Hence the ﬁrst condition, the incentive compatibility condition (IC) for the agenda setter
to propose gradualism is satisﬁed when SW(GR) ≥ SW(BB2):
αxc1 ≤ c2 − c1 (IC)
11 If c1 < βMc2, the median voter prefers BB1 to BB2, just like the patient agenda setter. The society
implements the most eﬃcient schedule, BB1, and the model ends here.
12 Since the problem is single peaked in β we know that the median voter theorem is applicable.
48or equivalently,
α ≤
c2 − c1
xc1
(=   α) (2.4)
The agenda setter has no incentive to propose gradualism with α larger than   α, because in
that case, the default option of BB2 gives higher social welfare.
From (2.2), we can also solve for the second condition U1(GR) ≥ U1(BB2). The political
constraint (PC) for gradualism is:
α(1 − β
M − x)c1 ≥ c1 − β
Mc2 (PC)
where βM denotes the median voter’s β. When 0 < x < 1 − βM, (PC) can be rewritten as:
α ≥
c1 − βMc2
(1 − βM − x)c1
(= α
∗) (2.5)
That is, a majority of the voters would prefer GR to BB2 at t = 1 if gradualism allows for
an α larger than α∗.
Combining these observations we get the following proposition.13
Proposition 1. The reform schedule that a patient agenda setter proposes depends on the
size of x. When x ≥ 1 − βM, (PC) cannot be satisﬁed for any 0 < α < 1, and hence
the agenda setter cannot propose GR. When 1 −
c1
c2 < x < 1 − βM, the range of α that
satisﬁes (PC) does not satisfy (IC), and hence the agenda setter does not propose GR. When
0 < x ≤ 1 −
c1
c2, the agenda setter proposes GR with α = α∗ where α∗ is deﬁned as in (2.5).
In words, when the ineﬃciency tied to gradualism, x, is too large, gradualism cannot
serve as an alternative to BB2. The loss of eﬃciency exceeds the cost of procrastination.
When x is in the intermediate range, the median voter prefers GR to BB2 as long as the
reform schedule allows for an α that is larger than α∗. However, from the agenda setter’s
point of view, a distortion of α∗ is not worth undertaking given the non-trivial size of x.
13 The proof is in the Appendix.
49Figure 2.1: Conditions for GR(α∗)
When x is small enough, however, both the median voter and the agenda setter agrees that
GR is superior to BB2. That is, there exists an α that satisﬁes both (IC) and (PC) (see
Figure 2.1). Because social welfare is decreasing in α, the agenda setter proposes the smallest
α that satisﬁes (PC), i.e. α∗.
Consider the following example: βM = 0.5, v = 15, c1 = 6, c2 = 10, x = 0.3
Plugging in these numbers to (2.2), the median voter’s utility from the reform is: U1(BB1) =
1.5, U1(GR) = 1.5+1.2α, and U1(BB2) = 2.5. From (2.3), we know that the patient agenda
setter’s valuation is: SW(BB1) = 9, SW(GR) = 9 − 1.8α, and SW(BB2) = 5. Social wel-
fare is highest when the reform is implemented as BB1, but the median voter prefers to
procrastinate. The agenda setter can then propose gradualism with α = 5
6 to make the me-
dian voter indiﬀerent between BB2 and GR. Notice that with α = 5
6, although social welfare
is not as high as that from BB1, it is still higher than that from BB2. This 5
6 is the α∗ in
(PC). Indeed, this example falls into the category in Proposition 1 where 0 < x < 1 −
c1
c2.
The example helps us understand the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Gradualism is ineﬃcient compared to the ﬁrst-best choice under time-
consistency (BB1) but welfare-enhancing compared to the default choice under time-inconsistency
(BB2).
Furthermore, it is important that the agenda setter is the one who chooses which α to
propose. If the agents are left to themselves and have the option of gradualism, they would
prefer GR with α ≈ 1 to both BB1 and BB2 as well as to GR(α∗), because U1(GR) is
increasing in α. From the perspective of social welfare, GR(α ≈ 1) is clearly inferior to
50GR(α∗).14
Proposition 3. Gradualism results in lower welfare without the existence of an agenda setter
who is more patient than the median voter.
2.2.3 Reforms with Other Time Structures
Although most cases of political reforms have the investment character discussed above,
i.e. have costs that precede beneﬁts, there are also policies that have diﬀerent structure in
terms of the timing of costs and beneﬁts. Two such cases are (i) reforms with immediate
beneﬁts, and (ii) reforms without any time lags in costs and beneﬁts.
First, consider reforms of the “immediate beneﬁt” type, i.e. with beneﬁts preceding costs.
There is no room for gradualism in this setting:
Proposition 4. Gradualism never arises in equilibrium for immediate beneﬁt reforms; grad-
ualism is neither politically feasible nor eﬃcient.
To see why, let the model remain the same as above, except that now the beneﬁts from
the reform are v = (v1,v2) with v1 < v2 whereas the costs are constant c = (c,c). Hence,
“waiting” yields higher welfare but time-inconsistent agents are tempted to take action “too
soon.” If we interpret gradualism analogously as above, it means moving a fraction α of the
beneﬁts further away in time, with an additional loss of xαv1.
The question is whether voters would ever prefer GR to BB1. Unlike in the case of
immediate cost reforms, GR here would never be attractive to the median voter because it
involves decreasing the beneﬁts today. The extra distortion involved with shifting makes
gradualism even less desirable.
A patient agenda setter, however, may still want to propose GR instead of BB1. The
reason is that this could make waiting till t = 2 (which the agenda setter may want to
14 We have assumed δ = 1 here but with δ < 1, GR(α ≈ 1) yields even lower social welfare than BB2.
That is, the choice of gradualism with α ≈ 1 can make the society worse oﬀ than with procrastination.
51do because v1 < v2) a relatively more attractive option for the median voter. However,
gradualism will never be the equilibrium. Unlike in the immediate cost case where gradualism
is ineﬃcient yet welfare-enhancing, in the immediate reward case, it is only ineﬃcient. The
default option of BB2 is always superior to GR, and if left by themselves, people will choose
BB1, so there is no reason for GR to become the ﬁnal outcome. Gradualism can only play
the role of deterrence.
Second, we can also imagine reforms where the costs and the beneﬁts are realized at
the same time. The payoﬀ from implementing a reform at t is then simply −ct + vt. The
following proposition holds in this setting:
Proposition 5. Gradualism never arises in equilibrium when reforms do not have time lags
between costs and beneﬁts; gradualism may be politically feasible but it is not eﬃcient.
If BB1 is preferred to BB2 at t = 0 (i.e. BB1 has higher social welfare), agents would do
so at t = 1 as well, and hence the agenda setter has no incentive to propose a schedule other
than BB1. On the other hand, if BB2 is better than BB1 at t = 0, there is a possibility that
the median voter’s preference switches at t = 1.15 The agenda setter, however, allows BB1
to happen. Although an impatient median voter may ﬁnd gradualism to be an alternative
to BB1 (as long as x is not too large), the agenda setter ﬁnds gradualism to be ineﬃcient.
There exists no α that would satisfy her (IC).
In sum, Propositions 4 and 5, when compared to Proposition 2, implies that not all
political reforms beneﬁt from gradualism. Depending on the time structure of the costs and
beneﬁts it may be the case that gradualism will never be a part of the equilibrium.
Proposition 6. Reforms of the “immediate cost” type can beneﬁt from gradualism, whereas
reforms where the beneﬁts precede the costs, or where there is no time lag between costs and
beneﬁts cannot.
15 This happens when βM(−c1 + v1) < βM(−c2 + v2) < −c1 + v1.
52Thus if gradualism is observed in these latter cases, it cannot be justiﬁed with agents
being present-biased.
2.3 Endogenizing the Agenda Setter
2.3.1 Setup
In the previous section, we assumed that the agenda setter is exogenously given and has
βAS = 1. We now relax this assumption and consider a citizen candidate framework. Any
agent can run for oﬃce (declare to be a candidate), and when elected she chooses a policy
that maximizes her own utility.16
Therefore, we add a voting stage t = 0 to the benchmark model. At this period, people
vote on a candidate with a speciﬁc β. The candidate who receives the most votes is elected
as the agenda setter. Thereafter, the model proceeds as before. At t = 1, the elected agenda
setter proposes a reform schedule and the citizens vote on the proposal. The proposal
that wins majority support is implemented. If the reform has not started by t = 2, it is
implemented as BB2 by default.
Now that agents vote for the agenda setter at t = 0 and the reform at t = 1, we have to
be more explicit about what agents believe about their future preferences.17 The behavioral
economics literature discusses two possibilities: agents are either sophisticated or naive.
Sophisticates are aware of their present-biasedness and know that they will have the same
self-control problem in the future. Naifs, on the other hand, have present-biased preferences
but (incorrectly) believe that they are time-consistent.
We concentrate on the case where agents are sophisticated, both because it is more
16 Standard models in political economy assume that candidates commit to implement any policy promise.
While legitimate in models where candidates have no policy preferences, one has to otherwise explain why
winning candidates keep their promises (Alesina, 1988; Besley and Coate, 1997).
17 This did not matter in the benchmark model because the agenda setter was exogenously given regardless
of the agents’ awareness of their own β.
53realistic and because it is more interesting to study.18 If the society is composed of naifs
only, the agenda setter’s β would not matter in the citizens’ voting decision because they
(incorrectly) anticipate BB1 to be proposed by any candidate. The agenda setter would just
be a random draw from the candidates, and hence policy outcomes would be unpredictable.
For simplicity, we also assume that the cost of running for oﬃce and the rents from being
in oﬃce are trivial. By doing so, we avoid having to make additional assumptions regarding
the relative size of the cost and beneﬁt of being an agenda setter that are unrelated to that
from the reform itself.
2.3.2 The Citizen Candidate Model
We solve the model by backward induction starting from t = 2. In this period, the
only available option is BB2. At t = 1, the available options are BB1, GR and BB2. Note
that the median voter’s problem at this time period is equivalent to that of the benchmark
model. His preferences are as in equation (2.2) with β = βM, so he would choose to delay
implementing the reform.
The agenda setter’s problem, however, is diﬀerent from the previous section. βAS may
not equal to one, and hence her utility can no longer be deﬁned as social welfare. The agenda
setter’s utility at t = 1 are:

      
      
U1
AS(BB1) = −c1 + βASv
U1
AS(GR) = −(1 − α)c1 − xαc1 + βAS(v − αc1)
U1
AS(BB2) = βAS(−c2 + v)
(2.6)
and the incentive compatibility condition (IC′) for the agenda setter to propose gradualism
18 Most economists assume sophistication because it implies that people have rational expectations about
future behavior (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). The use of various commitment devices to solve self-control
problems is one example that suggests people are aware of their time-inconsistency.
54Table 2.1: Policy Preferences by Agenda Setter’s βAS
Cases (IC′) Agenda Setter’s Preference
(a) βAS > 1−x and βAS ≥
c1
c2 holds for α ≤
c1−βASc2
(1−βAS−x)c1 GR, minα
(b) 1 − x ≤ βAS <
c1
c2 does not hold for any α > 0 BB2
(c)
c1
c2 < βAS ≤ 1 − x holds for all α > 0 GR, maxα
(d) βAS < 1−x and βAS ≤
c1
c2 holds for α ≥
c1−βASc2
(1−βAS−x)c1 GR, maxα
is now:
α(1 − β
AS − x)c1 ≥ c1 − β
ASc2 (IC′)
Thus the agenda setter’s choice depends not only on the relative size of x, c1, and c2 (as
in (IC)), but also on her own βAS. In Table 2.1, we summarize the agenda setter’s preferred
choice for each possible range of βAS.
An agenda setter with a large βAS (patient; case (a)), has strict standards for gradualism.
Even when implementing it, her incentive is to minimize distortions. In contrast, an agenda
setter with a small βAS (impatient; case (d)), would be willing to exploit the ﬂexibility of
gradualism with the largest α possible. The intermediate cases (b) and (c) depend on the
relative size of x with regards to
c1
c2. In any of these cases, the agenda setter’s preferred choice
may not lead to an actual proposal, however, because there is also the political constraint
to take into consideration.
Knowing the preferences in Table 2.1, agents vote on an agenda setter at t = 0. Agents
rationally expect what policy a candidate with a certain β would propose once elected. In
order to vote for the one who will maximize their utility (as of t = 0), the citizens must
determine which reform schedule would be the most eﬃcient.
Hence, agents compare U0(GR) and U0(BB2). There is no need to consider U0(BB1)
because sophisticates know that BB1 will never be proposed by any agenda setter at t = 1
55due to the political constraint.

  
  
U0(GR) = β(−c1 − xαc1 + v)
U0(BB2) = β(−c2 + v)
Thus, GR yields higher welfare than BB2 when the following inequality holds:
α ≤
c2 − c1
xc1
(=   α) (2.7)
That is, if there is an agenda setter who would propose an α that is smaller than   α, and if
that proposal could satisfy (PC) at t = 1, agents would vote for such a candidate. Otherwise,
gradualism fails to be a feasible option.
Which reform design would be at the intersection of the median voter’s and the agenda
setter’s interests? From Proposition 1, we know that when x ≥ 1 − βM, (PC) cannot be
satisﬁed for any 0 < α < 1. No agenda setter would be able to propose gradualism at t = 1
that survives majority ruling. BB2 would be the ﬁnal outcome regardless of the agenda
setter’s preferences.
When 1−
c1
c2 < x < 1−βM, the range of α that satisﬁes (PC) does not satisfy inequality
(2.7). That is, α∗ >   α. Thus agents do not want to elect a candidate who will propose GR(α)
that meets the political constraint, because gradualism is inferior to BB2 in this range of
x. So they elect an agenda setter who will not have any incentive to propose gradualism: a
candidate with 1 − x < βAS <
c1
c2 (Table 2.1 case (b)).
Lastly, when 0 < x ≤ 1 −
c1
c2, there exists an α such that satisﬁes both (2.7) and (PC).
That is, α∗ <   α. Thus for α ⊆ [α∗,   α], the median voter prefers GR to BB2 at t = 0 and at
t = 1. Hence, agents elect an agenda setter who would propose gradualism with an α in this
range, which is Table 2.1 case (a). The agenda setter proposes the smallest α that satisﬁes
her (IC′), and so GR(α∗) is implemented.
Therefore, gradualism only arises in equilibrium when x is small, as in the benchmark
56model. Because case (a) has βAS >
c1
c2, we know that βAS > βM automatically holds. We
have hence proved the following proposition:
Proposition 7. The elected agenda setter is more patient than the median voter but is not
necessarily an agent with β = 1.
The elected agenda setter proposes gradualism with the smallest eﬃciency cost possible
given the political constraint. Sophisticated agents are able to avoid the worst outcome of
procrastination by delegating the agenda setting authority to an agent who is more patient
than the median voter. We can also see that the benchmark model studied in the previous
section is a special case of this general model because βAS = 1 is one example of candidates
that belong to Table 2.1 case (a).
Let us consider the example in Section 2.2 again. The parameters are such that 0 < x ≤
1 −
c1
c2. Plugging in the numbers to (2.5) and (2.7), we get α∗ = 5
6 and   α = 20
9 . That is, at
t = 0, agents prefer GR to BB2 when α ≤ 20
9 (i.e. any 0 < α < 1) and at t = 1, agents
prefer GR to BB2 when α ≥
5
6. Among the politically feasible GR options, social welfare
is highest when α = 5
6. A candidate with β > 0.7 has the incentive to propose that reform
schedule, and so is elected to be the agenda setter.
Again, we see how agents avoid inferior gradual schedules by electing an agenda setter
who is more patient than the median voter (Proposition 3). This results in a reform schedule
more eﬃcient than BB2, which is what would have been implemented without the gradualism
option (Proposition 2).
2.4 Potential Applications of our Framework
In this section, we apply our model to policy areas with immediate costs and delayed
beneﬁts.
European ﬁscal crisis One example of a political problem that has so far only been
temporarily solved by gradual measures is the European sovereign debt crisis. This crisis has
57made it diﬃcult for some countries in the euro area to repay or re-ﬁnance their government
debt without the assistance of third parties.
That this problem was present was clear already at the beginning of the 2000s, when
several EU member states were failing to stay within the conﬁnes of the Maastricht treaty
(which limits ﬁscal spending and debt limits). That a solution had to be reached was widely
recognized, even though the exact form of solution was debated.
Attempts to solve the problem was however not made until almost ten years later, when
in 2009 the costs of the failing of the system became too large to handle as a result of the
ﬁnancial crisis aﬀecting government debt levels around the world. At that point various
solutions were contemplated. On the one hand, there were large scale solutions being sug-
gested that would cost more upfront but would work not only for currently aﬀected countries
but also for those potentially being aﬀected in the future. On the other hand, there were
solutions which provided gradual solutions, in the sense of putting out the ﬁre in currently
aﬀected countries only.
In the end, the latter path was chosen, and gradual solutions have since then been
provided for a number of countries, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and several
others. Even though the calculations are hard to make, it is not unreasonable to believe that
this solution, compared to a larger, one-time solution, has been much more costly, especially
if taking into account the continuous negative impact on ﬁnancial markets.
Environmental problems Environmental problems were recognized globally already
in 1972, when the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment agreed upon
common principles concerning the environment and development. Although countries at
diﬀerent stages of development had conﬂicting interests, there was an increasing consensus
that something must be done to prevent further destruction.
Finally in the mid-1980s, two international treaties were signed to protect the ozone
layer: the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol. These treaties oblige
developed countries to reduce the production of pollutants responsible for ozone depletion
58to half their 1986 levels by 1999 and developing nations to limit their future consumption of
such substances.
The protocols dictates phasing-out the production of numerous substances believed to be
responsible for ozone depletion. That is, the reform has a gradual design. It would be more
eﬃcient to reach target levels at once but such big bang approach would not gain majority
support (satisfy the political constraint). It would thus be welfare-enhancing to at least start
the reform by committing to a gradual schedule.
Congleton (1992) presents empirical evidence that authoritarian governments are less
likely to participate in environmental regulations compared to democratic regimes. Al-
though we do not explore diﬀerent political institutions in this paper, our model provides
one potential explanation for these ﬁndings. In democratic regimes, where any agent can run
for oﬃce as modelled in Section 2.3, the elected agenda setter would be more patient that
the median voter of the population. However, in authoritarian regimes, there is no reason
for the representative to be any more patient than the median voter, in which case, he would
opt for delay.
2.5 Conclusion
Reforms that everyone knows are inevitable and which would be most eﬃcient to im-
plement right away are often delayed and, when they are ﬁnally carried out, are done only
gradually. Why this is the case has been puzzling political economists for decades. Possible
reasons for gradualism and delay studied in the literature include heterogeneity in the payoﬀs
of the reform, uncertainty about the outcome of the reform, and political concerns such as
re-election.
This paper provides a new explanation for gradualism that builds on time-inconsistency
on the part of the voters. Our model is populated by agents who vary in their degree
of time-inconsistency, and features an agenda setting politician who has the authority to
make proposals to the voters on reform designs. The society must decide on when and how
59(gradually or as a big bang) a reform should be implemented.
We ﬁnd that given the choice, sophisticated agents elect an agenda setter who is more
patient than the median voter. That is, election is a kind of commitment device for present-
biased agents. Gradualism arises in equilibrium as a result of the trade-oﬀ between the
time-inconsistency of the median voter (who wants beneﬁts now regardless of the lost com-
plementarities) and the time-consistency of the agenda setter (who tries to minimize the
complementarities lost). Gradualism is ineﬃcient compared to the ﬁrst-best option but
welfare-enhancing compared to what would have been implemented without the option of
gradualism.
Moreover, by comparing various time structures of reforms, we show that gradualism
cannot be an equilibrium when there is no time lag between costs and beneﬁts or when
beneﬁts precede costs. That is, gradualism can be justiﬁed with the present-biasedness of
the voters only when reforms have immediate costs.
Our model is a ﬁrst step in the analysis of reform design under time-inconsistency. The
model suggests that even when the awareness of the need for reform is strong and it can
be argued that neither uncertainties nor heterogeneities in payoﬀs are crucial factors, delay
and gradualism may still occur. The paper sheds light on the virtues of gradualism when
agents are time-inconsistent, and thereby oﬀers a diﬀerent outlook to the existing debate on
big bang versus gradualism.
603. The Second Shift: Housework Time Among Immigrants
3.1 Introduction
Gender equity in the workplace has greatly increased during the past decades. But gender
inequity at home persists and women struggle to balance family and career. Hochschild
(1989) introduced the term “second shift” to capture the reality that many working women
have yet another shift after they come home from work—housework and childcare.1
The division of labor at home is dictated by various economic factors but it is also gov-
erned by gender norms. Regardless of labor market performances, women are still assumed
to take the role of primary homemaker and nurturer, particularly in societies with rigid
gender norms. But it is diﬃcult to assess how important or persistent cultural factors are in
determining household roles because countries diﬀer in many aspects.
This paper studies time spent on household chores among immigrants to the U.S. by
country of origin and generation since migrating. Using the 2003–2011 American Time
Use Survey, I document both the existence and fade-out of cultural eﬀects: the gender gap
in housework time is larger among immigrants from countries with lower female labor force
participation (FLFP) rates, but the gap reduces signiﬁcantly from ﬁrst to second generation.
Assimilation occurs among both men and women, but the eﬀects are mainly driven by the
decrease in housework time of women from low-FLFP countries.
Furthermore, spouse’s cultural background—source country and U.S. nativity—aﬀects
housework time. Exploiting variation in spouse’s characteristics within immigrants from the
1 See Goldin (2004) for a historical discussion of the changes in U.S. college graduate women’s family and
career choices.
61same country, I ﬁnd that both the FLFP rates in spouse’s country of origin and spouse’s
generation since migrating to the U.S. have signiﬁcant impacts on the housework time of
ﬁrst generation immigrants. Having a U.S. born spouse increases a man’s housework time
and reduces a woman’s.
The ﬁndings indicate that cultural factors impact how much time the husband and wife
allocate to household production even after controlling for the couple’s working hours and
family characteristics. That is, cultural persistence and assimilation eﬀects on housework
time are not merely the ﬂip side of the patterns found in immigrants’ labor market outcomes,
but a process in its own.
The paper contributes to the literature that investigates the importance of family culture
on economic outcomes (Giuliano, 2007; Fern´ andez and Fogli, 2009; Alesina and Giuliano,
2010) and also studies on immigrants’ assimilation proﬁles (Borjas, 1985; Blau, Kahn, and
Papps, 2011). Much of the research in these areas have focused on labor market outcomes
and fertility rates of European or Mexican descents. My paper shows that there is substan-
tial assimilation in immigrants’ gender roles with regards to household production, which
ultimately aﬀects married women’s capability of balancing work and family.
More broadly, the ﬁndings contribute to understanding the transition married women are
experiencing in their roles, and suggest how existing gender norms and spouse choice may be
key factors in shaping this evolution. As discussed in Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern (2008),
when women’s status in the labor market progresses further than that in the household,
the discrepancy leads to more work in general for women—they have jobs but also keep a
“traditional” home. First generation female immigrants from low FLFP countries experience
this double burden, particularly if they migrated with their husbands. Second generation,
however, develop less traditional gender attitudes growing up in the U.S., and they also
have more options in the U.S. marriage market. Women may break oﬀ from the norms in
their parent’s birthplace by marrying outside their ethnic group, to American men (Hwang,
2013a).
62The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and presents descriptive
patterns of U.S. immigrants’ housework time by sex, source country, and marital status.
Section 3.3 presents empirical evidence on assimilation in housework time across generations.
Section 3.4 studies how spouse’s cultural background inﬂuences housework time. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Patterns
3.2.1 Data
The 2003–2011 waves of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) conducted by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics contains information on time spent by respondents on both market
and non-market activities. There are several ways to deﬁne activities that constitute the
second shift, but I use “core non-market work” in Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008),
which includes the activities of food preparation, indoor cleaning, and washing or drying
clothes.2 (Child care is another major household activity, but it has both the component of
household production and leisure. See Aguiar and Hurst, 2007; Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney,
2008.) Throughout, I refer to “core non-market work” as housework.
As a measure of the gender roles in immigrants’ home country, I use female labor force
participation (FLFP) rates in father’s birthplace (FBPL).3 FLFP is commonly used in the
political economy literature as an indicator of a country’s family culture and women’s eco-
nomic status.4 The United Nations (UN) provides data (from the International Labor Or-
ganization) on women’s share of labor force in 187 countries starting from 1985. To focus on
adult women’s labor supply and to obtain statistics for as many countries as possible, I use
2 Time spent on shopping, and other home production such as home maintenance, outdoor cleaning,
vehicle repair, gardening, and pet care are excluded, as well as time spent on medical care, education, and
restaurant meals.
3 I can alternatively use mother’s birthplace and the results are similar (95 percent of respondents have
parents born in the same country).
4 See for example, Fern´ andez and Fogli, 2009; Alesina and Giuliano, 2010.
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Figure 3.1: Female Labor Force Participation Rates in Country of Origin
Notes. Map and histogram of the FLFP rates in FBPL, matched to the ATUS sample. FLFP in FBPL
is the labor force participation rates of women in age group 25–34 in 1985 in father’s birthplace. Data are
from the United Nations (UN). See Appendix C.1 for details. (a) Total of 121 countries in the UN data
are matched to the ATUS sample. Unmatched countries (either because they do not have data on FLFP
or because they are not available as FBPL in the ATUS) are in white. (b) Histogram of the FLFP rates in
FBPL, among married respondents. U.S. has FLFP rate of 70.9 percent in 1985.
64the FLFP rate of the 25–34 age group. I also use the oldest data available, 1985, to better
reﬂect the gender norms that immigrants were exposed to before migrating to the U.S.
Figure 3.1 (a) displays the countries matched to my sample and (b) plots the histogram
of the FLFP rates in father’s birthplace among married respondents. The FLFP rates ranges
from 22.2 percent to 94.7 percent, with the U.S. having a FLFP rate of 70.9 percent in 1985.
Countries with FLFP rates higher than that of the U.S. include Canada, Nordic countries,
former Communist countries, and a few African countries. Most countries in South and
Central America, East and South Asia, and the Middle East have lower FLFP rates.
For most analyses in this paper, only married couples with spouse present are considered
because couples who are currently separated or divorced do not face the same constraints in
determining time allocation as couples living together. Respondents enrolled in school and
couples with either respondent or spouse under age 25 are excluded from my sample as well.
In comparing across generations, I distinguish between ﬁrst and second generation using
the information on father’s birthplace. All foreign born immigrants are categorized as ﬁrst
generation regardless of their age at migration. Second generation are U.S. natives whose
fathers are foreign born.5 I do not include third or higher generations because their ancestry
cannot be identiﬁed with the ATUS data. (They all have U.S. as their father’s birthplace.)
Appendix Table C.1 contains the summary statistics of the married respondents in my
sample. All observations are weighted using the person weight. Second generation immi-
grants are on average older, more educated, have fewer children, and are from higher FLFP
countries relative to ﬁrst generation immigrants. More than one third of the ﬁrst generation
have Mexico as their father’s birthplace. I take these into account in my regressions.
5 There are no respondents who are foreign born yet with a U.S. born father in the sample, reducing the
possibility of bias from adoptees. Note that some second generation may not be U.S. born, because those
who are born abroad of American parents are also included in this group.
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Figure 3.2: Housework Time by Country of Origin and Marital Status
Notes. Linear predictions (with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals) of time spent on housework on FLFP in
FBPL. Data are from the 2003–2011 ATUS. See Appendix C.1 for details. FLFP in FBPL is the labor force
participation rates of women in age group 25–34 in 1985 in father’s birthplace. I exclude respondents under
age 25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey.
3.2.2 Descriptive Patterns
I begin by documenting the relationship between immigrants’ source country FLFP rates
and their housework time in the U.S. Figure 3.2 presents the hours per week spent on
housework by country of origin, sex, and marital status—never married with no kids and
married with spouse present.6 A number of observations can be made from this ﬁgure.
First, women spend more time on housework than men regardless of marital status or
6 I restrict the group of singles to those who do not have children in order to reduce the bias from there
being more single mothers than single fathers.
66source country FLFP rate. The gender gap is less than ﬁve hours per week among those
who have never married and have no kids, but can be as large as twenty hours per week for
those who are married and from countries with low FLFP rates.
Second, women’s housework time is inversely related to the FLFP rates in father’s birth-
place whereas men’s housework time is positively related (if not at all) to the FLFP rates
in father’s birthplace. Similar to the ﬁndings in the literature, immigrants’ behavior mirrors
the norms in their home country. But note that the variation is small among men—the
diﬀerence across countries of origin is driven by women from high FLFP countries doing less
housework than women from low FLFP countries.
Third, both the gender gap and the variation across immigrants’ countries of origin are
magniﬁed for married couples relative to singles. Although there is a few hours diﬀerence in
housework time between single men and women, their slopes with regards to FLFP rates are
almost ﬂat. This ﬁnding suggests that there are no fundamental diﬀerences across cultural
backgrounds in the amount of household work done by adults if not for the family roles that
begin with marriage.
In short, married women from low FLFP countries seem to be the ones doing the most
housework in the U.S. But are they doing more total work, or are the extra hours of
housework fully compensated by their fewer hours of labor market work?
Figure 3.3 plots the housework time and number of children of full-time working and
married women.7 Although the variation in housework time across countries of origin is
smaller than when all married women are considered (Figure 3.2), a gap of six hours per
week remains between low and high FLFP source country. The average number of children
is also higher among women from low FLFP countries. Thus even among married women
who are employed full-time, we observe strong source country eﬀects such that women from
low FLFP countries end up with more work in general.
7 Full-time employment is deﬁned as working 35 or more hours per week.
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Figure 3.3: Housework Time and Number of Children by Country of Origin, Full-Time Working
and Married Women
Notes. Linear predictions (with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals) of time spent on housework and number of
children under 18 in household on FLFP in FBPL, among full-time working and married women. Data are
from the 2003–2011 ATUS. See Appendix C.1 for details. FLFP in FBPL is the labor force participation
rates of women in age group 25–34 in 1985 in father’s birthplace. Full-time employment is considered to
be 35 or more hours per week. I exclude respondents under age 25 or enrolled in school at the time of the
survey.
683.3 Assimilation in Housework Time Across Generations
In the previous section, I demonstrated that the gender roles prevalent in one’s home
country, as measured by female labor force participation rates, have strong correlations
with the time married immigrant couples spend on household work in the U.S. But do these
eﬀects last until the second generation? Or is there assimilation in housework time producing
convergence to U.S. levels?
Figure 3.4 plots housework time of married men and women by their generation since
migrating to the U.S. Again, men’s housework hours are roughly constant regardless of the
FLFP rates in father’s birthplace. For women, the pattern is starkly diﬀerent by generation.
Housework time of ﬁrst generation women has a strong negative relationship with FLFP
rates in father’s birthplace whereas that of second generation women is relatively invariant
to source country. This means that the cross-FBPL variation in women’s housework time
observed in Figure 3.2 above is mostly due to the ﬁrst generation.
In addition to the ﬂatter slope with regards to source country FLFP rates, housework
time is shorter on average among second generation women relative to ﬁrst generation: the
mean drops from 20.7 hours per week to 15.4.8 Noting that the average time spent on
household chores among married women who are third (or higher) generation, non-Hispanic,
white is 14.6 hours per week, the trend suggests that immigrants’ housework time converges
to U.S. levels.
But for the diﬀerence across generations to be interpreted as assimilation in gender roles
at home, the diﬀerence must remain after controlling for the couple’s working hours. That is,
if the second generation have fewer housework hours because they have longer market work
hours, then the convergence in housework time cannot be separated from the assimilation
in labor market participation already documented in the literature. Moreover, if it is indeed
cultural assimilation (and not other factors that would aﬀect all U.S. immigrants similarly),
8 This does not take into account the potential diﬀerence in the composition of source countries in each
generation. I address this concern below.
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Figure 3.4: Assimilation in Housework Time, Married with Spouse Present
Notes. Linear predictions (with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals) of time spent on housework on FLFP in
FBPL, among married respondents. Data are from the 2003–2011 ATUS. See Appendix C.1 for details.
FLFP in FBPL is the labor force participation rates of women in age group 25–34 in 1985 in father’s
birthplace. I exclude respondents under age 25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey.
70there should be diﬀerential eﬀects for immigrants by their source country. The diﬀerence in
housework time between ﬁrst and second generation should be larger for immigrants from
countries with a larger gender norm gap with the U.S.—the more traditional countries.
Thus, I estimate the following equation to test for assimilation in housework time among
immigrants:
Yist = β0 + β1Xist + β2Secondist + β3FLFPist + θSecondist ∗ FLFPist + γt + δs + εist (3.1)
The dependent variable equals housework time (hours per week) of individual i living at
state s in year t. Xist are demographic controls such as age and educational attainment of
the couple.9 I include year (γt) and state (δs) ﬁxed eﬀects to take into account the variation
that may exist in the availability of market substitutes for household production.10 Dummies
for the respondent’s race and whether Mexican origin are also included.11 Key covariates
are Second, FLFP, and their interaction term. Second equals 1 if the respondent is second
generation and 0 if ﬁrst. FLFP is the female labor force participation rate in respondent’s
father’s birthplace (in 100 percentage point units, i.e. percentage divided by 100). Standard
errors are clustered by one’s father’s birthplace.
Table 3.1 reports the results, separately for the married men and women in my sample.
Col. 1 controls for demographic characteristics, family income, and state and year ﬁxed
eﬀects. Usual working hours of both the respondent and the spouse, and the number and
age of children are additionally taken into account in cols. 2 and 3, respectively.12 Col. 4
includes all the controls.
9 Using dummies for college graduate and high school graduate instead of years of education as covariates
yields similar results.
10 Low-skilled immigrants are employed in services that are close substitutes for household production,
and hence the population of immigrants may aﬀect the labor supply of educated women in that region. See
Cortes and Tessada (2011).
11 Race has 21 categories and includes multiple-race in addition to all major single race classiﬁcations.
12 Usual work hours are only available for individuals who are employed. I recode the variable to zero for
those currently unemployed. Individuals who responded “hours vary” are excluded from the analyses.
71Table 3.1: Assimilation in Housework Time, Married with Spouse Present
Dependent variable: Housework time (hours per week)
Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Second generation 3.058*** 2.004* 3.993*** 2.775** -8.635*** -6.613*** -9.290*** -7.431***
(1.046) (1.053) (1.415) (1.342) (1.897) (1.579) (1.897) (1.644)
FLFP rate in FBPL 0.746 0.440 3.374* 2.524 -8.128*** -5.445*** -6.971*** -4.294**
(1.476) (1.449) (1.745) (1.731) (2.292) (2.006) (2.273) (1.926)
Second gen*FLFP rate in FBPL -4.883*** -3.836* -6.289** -4.653* 8.775** 5.603* 10.104*** 8.475**
(1.853) (2.041) (2.715) (2.722) (3.386) (2.947) (3.396) (3.271)
ln(Family income) -0.039 0.215 -0.185 -0.081 -2.120*** -1.138*** -3.127*** -2.348***
(0.183) (0.226) (0.221) (0.249) (0.410) (0.393) (0.355) (0.360)
Usual work hours -0.077*** -0.081*** -0.244*** -0.243***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.019) (0.024)
Spouse’s usual work hours 0.048*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.054**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.021)
No. of children under 18 0.179 0.279 0.894*** 0.640***
(0.201) (0.188) (0.295) (0.235)
Age of youngest child in household -0.003 -0.018 0.014 0.122**
(0.034) (0.039) (0.077) (0.061)
Control for age, educ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mexico FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,683 4,192 3,035 2,725 5,240 4,842 3,525 3,306
Dependent variable mean 4.55 4.56 4.61 4.69 19.42 19.49 21.11 21.20
Notes. Eﬀect of country of origin and U.S. nativity on housework time, among married respondents. Data are from the 2003-2011 ATUS. See Appendix
C.1 for details. FLFP rate in FBPL is the labor force participation rate of women in age group 25-34 in father’s birthplace in 1985 (in 100 percentage point
units). ln(Family income) is the log of family income (in 1999 dollars). Controls for both respondent’s and spouse’s age and years of education are included. I
exclude respondents under age 25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey. Standard errors are clustered by father’s birthplace. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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2For men, in all four speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient on second generation is positive whereas
the interaction term is negative. (The marginal eﬀect of FLFP rate in father’s birthplace is
positive but insigniﬁcant, except in col. 3.) That is, second generation men spend more time
on housework compared with ﬁrst generation men, but the diﬀerence is smaller for those who
are from high FLFP countries. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient on Second decreases when
the couple’s working hours are included, but still remains non-trivial in size (more than two
hours per week).
Cols. 5-8 repeats the exercise for married women. In all four columns, the coeﬃcient on
Second is large and negative, FLFP is negative, and the interaction term is positive. They
are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. This means that second generation
women spend less time on housework compared with ﬁrst generation women, but the diﬀer-
ence is smaller for those who are from high FLFP countries. The marginal eﬀect of FLFP
rate in father’s birthplace is negative, consistent with the negative slope observed in Figure
3.4.
The coeﬃcient on Second does not change much in magnitude with the inclusion of
covariates regarding children (compare col. 5 with 7 and 6 with 8). However, when the
working hours of the couple are taken into consideration (cols. 6 and 8), the size of the
coeﬃcient on Second decreases by more than 2.2 hours per week—from about 9.8 hours to
7.6 hours. So some of the variation in housework time is indeed absorbed by diﬀerences in
labor force participation: women from low FLFP countries work fewer hours in the labor
market than women from high FLFP countries. But there still remains a large gap of more
than seven hours per week across the two generations.
Note that my estimates of the eﬀect of second generation on housework time may be
attenuated due to the inclusion of child immigrants in the ﬁrst generation group. Those who
came to the U.S. when they were young, and hence who may well have as less traditional gen-
der attitudes as those who were born in the U.S., are categorized as ﬁrst generation. If only
adult immigrants were compared with the second generation, the generational diﬀerences in
73housework time would be even larger than those found here.
To address the concern that the diﬀerence between ﬁrst and second generation may be
confounded by shifts in the composition of countries of origin across generations, in Appendix
Table C.2, I include father’s birthplace ﬁxed eﬀects. This exercise transforms the analysis
above into within-FBPL comparisons. I ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on Second remains negative
and statistically signiﬁcant for women though smaller in magnitude. For men, the coeﬃcient
on second generation is not statistically signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation.13
In sum, I ﬁnd that there is assimilation in housework time among U.S. immigrants in
addition to the assimilation in their labor market participation. Controlling for the mar-
ried couple’s working hours and other family characteristics, there still exists a signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in housework time between the ﬁrst and second generation: men’s housework
hours increase whereas women’s decrease. Robustness check with father’s birthplace ﬁxed
eﬀects conﬁrms the intergenerational assimilation among women. Diﬀerential eﬀects across
countries of origin and gender is suggestive of an impact of source country gender norms
rather than unmeasured factors that could aﬀect men and women from diﬀerent countries
similarly.
3.4 The Spouse Eﬀect on Housework Time
Because housework is in large measure a public good for the household, if one spouse
does more, the other may do less. Thus housework time is not only a function of the time
spent on other activities but also the time one’s spouse spends on various activities. It need
not be a zero-sum game, however; the couple has the option of outsourcing, for example,
eating out or hiring a domestic worker.
Given the labor market productivity of the couple and the price of market substitutes
for household production, the couple’s decision regarding housework—its allocation between
13 There may also be diﬀerences in spouse’s cultural background associated with one’s generation. I discuss
the spouse eﬀect in the next section.
74Table 3.2: Spouse’s Generation and Father’s Birthplace
Panel A: Spouse’s generation Panel B: Spouse’s FBPL
First Second Third+ Same FBPL Diﬀerent FBPL
Men:
First Generation 0.824 0.050 0.126 0.754 0.246
Second Generation 0.135 0.313 0.552 0.299 0.701
Total 0.633 0.123 0.244 0.62 0.3728
Women:
First Generation 0.774 0.060 0.166 0.712 0.288
Second Generation 0.149 0.315 0.536 0.282 0.718
Total 0.602 0.130 0.268 0.593 0.407
Notes. Fraction of spouses in each generation and father’s birthplace (FBPL) group, among married re-
spondents. Data are from the 2003–2011 ATUS. See Appendix C.1 for details. Third generation refers to
U.S. natives whose fathers were also born in the U.S. Same FBPL means the spouse has the same FBPL as
the respondent. I exclude respondents under age 25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey.
the husband and wife, and its total amount—would thus be inﬂuenced by both own and
spouse’s beliefs in gender roles at home.14 In this section, I study the importance of spouse’s
cultural background in determining one’s housework time.
Table 3.2 presents the fraction of my sample’s spouses in each generation (Panel A)
and father’s birthplace (Panel B) category. As noted in previous studies, own and spouse
characteristics are highly correlated. In particular, the vast majority of ﬁrst generation
immigrants have spouses who are ﬁrst generation (nearly 80 percent) or who have the same
father’s birthplace (more than 70 percent). Second generation immigrants are more likely
to have spouses who do not share their father’s birthplace—about 70 percent have spouses
with diﬀerent FBPL from their own. But more than 85 percent of the second generation’s
spouses are U.S. born as well (either second, third, or higher generation).
The collinearity between respondent’s and spouse’s generation and/or country of origin
makes it diﬃcult to estimate the impact of spouse’s cultural background. To investigate the
spouse eﬀect, I hence break down the sample to subgroups—by sex and generation.
14 Because housework deﬁned in this paper does not include activities such as breastfeeding, it is reasonable
to assume that there need not be inherent gender diﬀerences in housework productivity. This is particu-
larly true with the advancement and prevalence of household appliances today (Greenwood, Seshadri, and
Yorukoglu, 2005).
75The estimating equation is similar to (3.1) with the respondent’s housework time as the
dependent variable.15 But now spouse’s FLFP in father’s birthplace and generation since
migrating to the U.S. are the key covariates, and standard errors are clustered by spouse’s
father’s birthplace. Although my sample consists of ﬁrst and second generation immigrants
only, they may well have third or higher generation as spouses. So I include two dummies—
Spouse U.S. born and Spouse third generation. Spouse U.S. born equals 1 if the spouse is
either second or higher generation, and Spouse third generation equals 1 if the spouse is third
or higher generation.
FBPL ﬁxed eﬀects are included as well as other demographic controls, race, state, and
year ﬁxed eﬀects. That is, I study the eﬀect of spouse’s cultural background holding constant
the source country of the respondent, thereby exploiting variation in spouses’ characteristics
within respondents from the same country. This reduces the bias that may arise due to
women from high (or low) FLFP country disproportionately marrying men from high (or
low) FLFP country, or due to shifts in the composition of countries from which immigrants
originate.
Table 3.3 presents the estimation results separately for ﬁrst and second generation male
respondents (cols. 1-4 and cols. 5-8, respectively). The speciﬁcations with regard to including
working hours and children as controls are as in Table 3.1 above. For ﬁrst generation men,
the coeﬃcient on FLFP rate in wife’s father’s birthplace is negative whereas the coeﬃcient
on wife third generation is positive.16 For second generation men, wife’s country of origin
loses its statistical signiﬁcance. Only wife’s U.S. nativity continues to be positively related
with man’s housework time with a marginal eﬀect of about two to three per week, depending
on the speciﬁcation.
Similarly, Table 3.4 presents the estimation results separately for ﬁrst and second gen-
15 Although demographic characteristics of other household members are available in the ATUS, time use
information is only collected from the respondent. Hence, I cannot look at the ratio of housework done by
the respondent relative to the spouse. However, the inference may be similar because there is not much
variation across households in husbands’ housework time.
16 Only 6 percent of ﬁrst generation men have second generation spouses. See Table 3.2 Panel A.
76Table 3.3: Eﬀect of Wife’s Cultural Background on Man’s Housework Time
Dependent variable: Housework time (hours per week)
First generation men Second generation men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FLFP rate in wife’s FBPL -5.586** -6.354*** -6.823** -7.297*** 3.330 4.677 -0.901 -0.418
(2.472) (2.222) (2.970) (2.581) (2.821) (2.897) (3.606) (3.999)
Wife U.S. born 0.621 0.940 1.091 0.998 1.824*** 1.782*** 3.422*** 3.053***
(0.882) (1.183) (0.678) (0.795) (0.513) (0.511) (0.973) (0.931)
Wife third generation 1.544* 1.493 1.868** 2.172** -0.903 -1.480** 0.195 0.387
(0.927) (1.133) (0.884) (0.943) (0.711) (0.721) (0.929) (1.113)
ln(Family income) -0.298 -0.040 -0.539** -0.311 0.655*** 0.890** 0.157 -0.070
(0.196) (0.227) (0.226) (0.336) (0.191) (0.358) (0.495) (0.351)
Usual work hours -0.080*** -0.091*** -0.064*** -0.045***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.010) (0.014)
Wife’s usual work hours 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.040*** 0.049**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.022)
No. of children under 18 0.271* 0.366** 0.006 0.154
(0.156) (0.151) (0.232) (0.189)
Age of youngest child in household 0.008 -0.006 -0.160** -0.132***
(0.026) (0.022) (0.070) (0.035)
Control for age, educ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FBPL FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,408 3,042 2,449 2,195 1,310 1,177 617 554
Dependent variable mean 4.43 4.53 4.49 4.61 4.97 4.72 5.30 5.22
Notes. Eﬀect of wife’s country of origin and U.S. nativity on man’s housework time. Data are from the 2003-2011 ATUS. FLFP rate in FBPL is the
labor force participation rate of women in age group 25-34 in father’s birthplace in 1985 (in 100 percentage point units). ln(Family income) is the log of
family income (in 1999 dollars). Controls for both respondent’s and wife’s age and years of education are included. I exclude respondents under age 25
or enrolled in school at the time of the survey. Standard errors are clustered by wife’s father’s birthplace. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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7Table 3.4: Eﬀect of Husband’s Cultural Background on Woman’s Housework Time
Dependent variable: Housework time (hours per week)
First generation women Second generation women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FLFP rate in husband’s FBPL -8.933*** -6.757** -4.484 -3.197 -1.756 -0.749 -5.317 -3.407
(3.235) (2.708) (3.828) (4.036) (4.245) (4.858) (5.469) (5.489)
Husband U.S. born 0.276 0.339 0.724 0.845 2.345** 2.359** 1.047 0.262
(1.584) (1.465) (1.341) (1.022) (1.145) (1.180) (1.346) (1.190)
Husband third generation -3.177* -2.896* -3.735** -3.754*** -1.193 -1.784 -0.975 -1.024
(1.632) (1.498) (1.499) (1.316) (0.953) (1.152) (1.532) (1.478)
ln(Family income) -1.692*** -1.008** -2.963*** -2.351*** -2.238*** -0.838 -3.007** -0.876
(0.459) (0.424) (0.471) (0.442) (0.624) (0.697) (1.176) (0.777)
Usual work hours -0.252*** -0.239*** -0.203*** -0.267***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020)
Husband’s usual work hours 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.074** -0.003
(0.016) (0.017) (0.034) (0.045)
No. of children under 18 0.783*** 0.478** 1.262** 1.226**
(0.206) (0.198) (0.515) (0.505)
Age of youngest child in household 0.050 0.162** -0.112 0.086
(0.064) (0.072) (0.124) (0.115)
Control for age, educ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FBPL FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,855 3,559 2,774 2,601 1,440 1,332 785 736
Dependent variable mean 20.85 20.94 22.30 22.36 15.28 15.41 16.05 16.23
Notes. Eﬀect of husband’s country of origin and U.S. nativity on woman’s housework time. Data are from the 2003-2011 ATUS. FLFP rate in FBPL is
the labor force participation rate of women in age group 25-34 in father’s birthplace in 1985 (in 100 percentage point units). ln(Family income) is the log of
family income (in 1999 dollars). Controls for both respondent’s and husband’s age and years of education are included. I exclude respondents under age 25
or enrolled in school at the time of the survey. Standard errors are clustered by husband’s father’s birthplace. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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8eration female respondents (cols. 1-4 and cols. 5-8, respectively). First generation women’s
housework time is negatively correlated with both the FLFP rate in husband’s father’s birth-
place and husband being third generation. Having an American husband is associated with
a reduction of woman’s housework time by about three hours per week. However, for second
generation women, husbands’ cultural background no longer plays a statistically signiﬁcant
role once the couple’s working hours and number of children are taken into account.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 indicate that spouse’s country of origin and generation aﬀect house-
work time of both male and female ﬁrst generation immigrants. The eﬀect of spouse’s
source country is statistically signiﬁcant despite the fact that a majority of ﬁrst generation
immigrants have spouses with the same country of origin as themselves (Table 3.2 Panel B).
The relatively weak spouse eﬀect observed among second generation men and women
may be explained via two channels. First, as implied by the ﬁndings in the previous section,
the respondents themselves are much more Americanized in the second generation. Hence,
regardless of whom they marry, they may follow U.S. gender norms.
Second, spouse selection may be important. As seen in Table 3.2, second generation
have very diﬀerent marriage patterns relative to the ﬁrst generation, in that they are much
more likely to have spouses who are U.S. natives and who are not from the same country as
themselves. Home country gender norms will be less persistent when spouses do not share
the same culture. Of course, this itself is an individual choice.17 The positive coeﬃcient on
Wife U.S. born, for example, does not prove the causal eﬀect of American wives on husbands’
housework time. U.S. born women may have chosen to marry those who are more willing to
help out with household chores in the ﬁrst place.
In either case, it is clear that the spouse eﬀect exists among immigrants, particularly
among the ﬁrst generation. The ﬁndings in this section also imply that the assimilation in
housework time observed across generations can be partly attributed to whom immigrants
17 As discussed in Fern´ andez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) and Hwang (2013a), utility in marriage may diﬀer
signiﬁcantly depending on the type of husband—traditional or modern.
79in each generation marry.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the cultural eﬀects on housework time among married immigrants
in the U.S. Using the 2003-2011 American Time Use Survey, I study the time married men
and women spend on basic household chores by their country of origin and generation since
migrating to the U.S. The gender norms in their country of origin are represented by the
female labor force participation (FLFP) rates.
I ﬁnd that FLFP rates in father’s birthplace have strong negative correlations with the
housework time of ﬁrst generation married women. However, assimilation in women’s house-
work time occurs dramatically such that the variation across countries of origin nearly dis-
appears by the second generation, and there is convergence towards U.S levels. Controlling
for family characteristics and the couple’s working hours yields similar results.
The eﬀect of source country, and hence assimilation thereafter are not observed as strongly
among male immigrants, however. They only spend a few hours per week on housework re-
gardless of their cultural background, although second generation men from high female labor
supply countries do contribute slightly more to household production than ﬁrst generation
men from low female labor supply countries.
The lack of variation in men’s housework time does not imply that their cultural back-
ground is irrelevant to household time allocation, however. I ﬁnd that husband’s country
of origin and U.S. nativity have signiﬁcant eﬀects on his wife’s housework time, particularly
when the wife is foreign born.
The ﬁndings suggest that growing up in a country with less traditional gender norms
aﬀects household time allocation by changing one’s beliefs about appropriate gender roles
at home, and by changing the pool of potential spouses. Not only are the second generation
more likely to have less traditional gender norms compared with their parents, but they are
also more likely to have spouses who were born in the U.S. It is diﬃcult to identify how
80much of the spouse eﬀect is causal versus marital selection. But either way, marriage serves
dual roles: it helps adult immigrants persist source country practices after coming to the
U.S. while facilitating assimilation among the higher generations.
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82A. Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1 Korean Data
The Korean Population Census is collected by the National Statistical Oﬃce every ﬁve
years and are 2 percent samples of the population, excluding the institutionalized. Micro-
data is available for years 1995, 2000, and 2005. The 2005 data does not distinguish between
four-year colleges and less than four-year colleges, however, and hence I only use the 1995 and
2000 samples (N = 1,756,493). For the most recent cohorts, I use the Korean Economically
Active Population Survey instead. It is collected monthly and covers individuals age 15 and
older (both in and out of labor force) in Korea. I pool all months of 2012 (N = 327,865).
Korea’s Time Use Survey is collected by the National Statistical Oﬃce and covers house-
hold members older than age 10 in 8,100 households nationwide. “Household Activities”
corresponds to the same category in the Bureau of Labor Statistics time use data. Activities
such as housework, food and drink preparation and clean-up, interior maintenance, exterior
maintenance, vehicle maintenance, and household management are included. It does not
include time spent on caring for children or other family members.
A.1.2 Hong Kong Data
The 2006 Hong Kong Population By-Census is collected by the Hong Kong Census and
Statistics Department and is a 5 percent sample of the population (N = 460,197). Edu-
cational attainment is deﬁned using the variable EDUCNH (highest level completed). The
83four groups corresponding to high school, junior college, college, and graduate school are:
senior secondary, post-secondry (non-degree), post-secondary (degree), and graduate school.
More speciﬁcally, senior secondary includes secondary forms 4 to 7; post-secondary (non-
degree) includes various diploma courses and vocational training schools; post-secondary
(degree) includes degree institutions; graduate level includes master degree, PhD, and other
postgraduate courses.
A.1.3 Japanese Data
The JGSS has a variable WEIGHT to weight data for population estimates based on
the Japanese Population Census. In the 2000–2005 datasets, this is produced by calculating
the number of people which one respondent represents by taking into account sex (two
categories), 10–year age group (six categories), region (six categories), and city or not (two
categories). From 2006, the variable is produced by sex (two categories) and 10–year age
groups (seven categories). In order to attach weights across survey years, I harmonize this
variable so that weight is constructed from sex (two categories) and 10–year age group (six
categories) for all years in my sample.
Income (SZINCOMX, SSSZINCM) reports the total annual income during the previous
year (before taxes and other deductions) from main job. This is converted into 1999 yen
using the Consumer Price Index adjustment factors. All top-coded values in each year are
multiplied by 1.45.
In the 2008 survey, age is reported in intervals. I construct respondents’ exact age by
subtracting birth year (which is available across all years) from the year of the survey.
Respondents under age 25 are excluded from the sample. However, birth year for spouse is
not provided. Hence, I take the midpoint of each 10–year age group for the spouse. The
intervals range from age group 20–29 to 90–99. Hence, spouses who are actually under age
25 may be included in the analyses.
To control for the number of children when analyzing married women’s labor force par-
84ticipation, we need to know the number of children (under a certain age) who are currently
living with the respondent. Total number of children (CCNUMTTL) variable in the JGSS,
however, counts both those who left home or are deceased. Hence, I construct a variable
that counts the number of children under 19 living with the respondent by compiling the age
of each child (CC01AGE, CC02AGE, etc.) as reported by the respondent. Because child’s
age is categorical data in 10–year age groups, I use 19 as the cut-oﬀ (instead of 18, as in
other datasets).
The Japanese Time Use Survey is conducted by the Bureau of Statistics and covers
household members older than age 10 in 99,000 households nationwide. “Housework” is
a separate category from “Child care” and “Nursing” and includes activities such as food
preparation, cleaning, caring for family members other than children, keeping the family
account, and visits to the public oﬃce on personal or family matters.
A.1.4 ATUS
I weigh all observations using the person weight (WT06) to make the sample represen-
tative. Family income (FAMINCOME) includes the income of all members of the house-
hold who are 15 years of age or older. Income includes money from jobs, net income from
business, pensions, dividends, interest, Social Security payments, and any other monetary
income received by family members. This is the only earnings information available on the
self-employed as well. It is based on categorical data; I calculate the midpoint of the cate-
gorical variable. When top-coded ($75,000 from January to September in 2003 and $150,000
thereafter), it is multiplied by a factor of 1.45.
Individuals whose father’s birthplace (FBPL) is indicated as regions or continents, such as
“Central America n.s.” and “Africa n.s.” are excluded from the analyses. For the countries
that are named or grouped diﬀerently in the ATUS from the United Nations dataset, the
following adjustments have been made (FBPL are assigned the LFP rate of the country in
parenthesis): Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic (Czech Republic); Korea and South Korea
85(Republic of Korea); England, Scotland, Wales, United Kingdom, and United Kingdom n.s.
(United Kingdom); Ireland and Northern Ireland (Ireland); Other USSR/Russia and USSR
n.s. (Russian Federation).
A.1.5 U.S. Census and ACS
I weigh all observations using the IPUMS person weight (PERWT) to make the sample
representative. Age at migration is calculated by subtracting the respondent’s birthyear
from the year of immigration variable. For cases when the year of immigration is given
as intervals, I take the most conservative approach by using the last year in the bracket
(to ensure that I do not include any immigrants who came to the U.S. when older than
17). Income (INCTOT) reports total pre-tax personal income or losses from all sources
for the previous year. This is converted into 1999 dollars using the Consumer Price Index
adjustment factors. All top-coded values in each year are multiplied by 1.45.
A.2 Technical Appendix
A.2.1 Discussions
Disutility Term and Joint Maximization
Other things equal, assume that the disutility term is in men’s utility function instead of
women’s. Then the utility of a married man of type M and T are:

  
  
VM(wm,wf) = max0≤tm≤1
1
2(tmwm + tfwf) + βlog((1 − tm) + (1 − tf))
VT(wm,wf) = max0≤tm≤1
1
2(tmwm + tfwf) + βlog((1 − tm) + (1 − tf)) − (α0 + α1(tf))
whereas a married woman’s utility function is invariant to the type of husband:
Vf(wm,wf) = max
0≤tf≤1
1
2
(tmwm + tfwf) + βlog((1 − tm) + (1 − tf))
86Given wm > wf, a married man always works t∗
m = 1. Unlike in Section 1.3.2, a woman’s
optimal time allocation, t∗
f, now does not depend on the type of husband: if wf > 2β, she
spends 1 −
2β
wf of her time on market activities and if wf ≤ 2β, she stays at home.
Since t∗
f is increasing in wf, and men’s disutility is also increasing in t∗
f, there is a
threshold wage wf where VT drops below νm.1 Hence, Gold Misses arise when traditional
men reject educated women with wages above this threshold. (This contrasts with the model
where educated women are choosing to remain single.) The expected utility from becoming
educated (VE(λM)) and the fraction of educated women (λE) thus decrease as women’s wages
rise over time.
Therefore, the model is not isomorphic to the case with the disutility term in men’s utility
function. In papers that study only married couples (and not whether to marry or not) or
that do not focus on changes in women’s wages over time (for example, Fern´ andez, Fogli,
and Olivetti, 2004) both setups may yield similar results.
Alternatively, the two cases may be isomorphic in a joint maximization framework. For
example, let each married household maximize the following weighted average of husband’s
and wife’s utility:
max
0≤tm,tf≤1
θUm(cm,h,tm,tf) + (1 − θ)Uf(cf,h,tm,tf) (A.1)
where 0 < θ < 1, ci is consumption, h is household public goods, and ti is deﬁned as before.
(Unmarried agent’s utility function is deﬁned analogously.)
Assume that time spent on market activity enters directly into the utility function because
the disutility from working is smaller than the disutility from doing household chores. That
is, in addition to earning market wage wi, self-fulﬁllment, working conditions, and other
fringe beneﬁts from a job are higher than from staying at home.2
1 I abstract from the trivial case where the disutility is so small that everybody marries.
2 Note that this does not imply that individuals enjoy working per se.
87Hence, some function of ti and tj enters in the utility of agent i married to agent j, where
the marginal utility from ti, MUti, is positive. For simplicity, assume MUtj = 0 for all women
and modern men. That is, apart from the utility gain from increase in household income,
there need not be any additional utility gain from one’s spouse working versus staying at
home.
Traditional men, however, are characterized by MUtj ≪ 0. They get disutility from wife
working. Thus, solving equation (A.1) given wages, a woman is more likely to be a housewife
when her husband is traditional.
Furthermore, since the disutility from working is smaller than that from housework,
a woman with a suﬃciently high wage would choose to remain single when matched to a
traditional man. When single, she can optimally outsource housework whereas when married
to a traditional man, she has to do the less enjoyable housework due to her husband’s
disutility. Men always prefer to marry since with wm > wf, they always work in equilibrium.
Eﬀort and Wage Distributions
Wages may be proportionate to the eﬀort exerted such that a greater e generates a better
wage distribution (in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance). That is, W(wf;e) would
be a continuous cumulative distribution function with support [0,wm) where W(wf;e2) ≤
W(wf;e1) ∀wf if e2 > e1.
Women diﬀer in their costs of investing in education, C(e). Each woman chooses e to
maximize her expected utility:
max
e≥0
W(2β;e)VU(λM) + (1 − W(2β;e))VE(λM) − C(e)
where VU(λM) and VE(λM) are deﬁned as in equation (1.7). Once a woman chooses her
optimal e∗, she draws her wage from W(wf;e∗). If her wage is higher than 2β, she works in
equilibrium. If her wage is lower, she becomes a full-time housewife.
88The diﬀerence with my model is that by choosing e, each woman can directly aﬀect the
wage distribution from which she draws from. Since the support of W(wf;e) is [0,wm), there
is a probability that even an educated woman draws a wage lower than 2β. Thus, women
would be distinguished by their revealed wages instead of their education investment per
se. Consequently, equation (1.9) would also be redeﬁned, such that λE equals the fraction
of women who draw wages above 2β. Marriage and household time allocation decisions are
unaﬀected since they are functions of wf, and not e.
This alternative setup would require one to deﬁne how e translates into diﬀerent wage
distributions and how that also interacts with the wage distribution exogenously changing
over time.
A.2.2 Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1. When α0 and α1 satisfy equation (1.5), wE <   wE < wm. When they are
larger,   wE < wE < wm. When they are smaller, wE < wm <   wE.
Proof. wE <   wE holds if νf < VET at wf = wE. wE can be found from equating VUT with
VET. Plug in the expression for wE to equations (1.3) and (1.4). The inequality with regards
to α is: α0 + α1 < 1
2(wm − wE) + βlog2
  wE < wm holds if νf > VET at wf = wm. Plug in wm to equations (1.3) and (1.4). The
inequality with regards to α is: α0 + α1 > βlog2.
When both inequalities above are satisﬁed, wE <   wE < wm.
Proposition 2.   e(λM) is an increasing function of λM, and   e(λM) ≥ 0 always holds.
Proof. Since   e(λM) is deﬁned as in equation (1.8) and VU
′(λM) = α0, we just need to show
that VE
′(λM) > α0 holds.
VE
′(λM) =
  wE
2β
(VEM − VET)dW +
  e wE
wE
α0dW +
  wm
e wE
(VEM − νf)dW
89Plugging in the equations for VEM, VET, and νf from equations (1.3) and (1.4), the expression
becomes:
VE
′(λM) = α0 +
  wE
2β
(
1
2
wE − β + βlog(
2β
wE
))dW +
  wm
e wE
(
1
2
(wm − wE) + βlog2 − α0)dW
The ﬁrst integral is non-negative when wE ≥ 2β. (It equals zero if wE are all higher than
wE.) By assumption (1.5) and that α0 ≤ βlog2, the second integral is positive. (It would
equal zero if and only if α0 = βlog2 and there is a discrete jump at wE = wm such that
prob(  wE ≤ wE < wm) = 0. Since W(wE) is a continuous cumulative function over (2β,wm),
the latter condition cannot hold.) Hence VE
′(λM) > α0 and therefore VE
′(λM)−VU
′(λM) > 0.
Since   e(λM) is an increasing function of λM, it is suﬃcient to show that   e(0) > 0.
  e(0) =
  e wE
2β VETdW +
  wm
e wE νfdW − VUT. We know that VET = VUT when 2β < wE ≤ wE,
VET > VUT when wE < wE ≤   wE, and νf > VET when wE >   wE. Thus   e(0) ≥ 0 always
holds.
Proposition 3. Given Wt−1(.) and λMt−1, if the distribution Wt1(.) ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates Wt2(.), FEt1 ≥ FEt2.
Proof. Given Wt−1(.) and λMt−1, λMt is determined regardless of Wt(.) (see equation (1.1)).
  e(λMt) = VE(λMt) − VU(λMt). VU(λMt) is invariant to changes in wE. So we just need to
show that
VE(λMt) =
  e wE
2β
(λMtVEM + (1 − λMt)VET)dWt +
  wm
e wE
(λMtVEM + (1 − λMt)νf)dWt
is larger under Wt1(.) than under Wt2(.).
By deﬁnition of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, Wt1(  wE) ≤ Wt2(  wE) and hence the
probability weight on the second integral is relatively larger under Wt1(.) than under Wt2(.).
Since VEM is an increasing function of wE and VET < νf when wE >   wE (by deﬁnition of
  wE), (λMVEM +(1 −λM)νf) is larger than (λMVEM + (1−λM)VET). Hence the probability
90weight on the larger term is larger under Wt1(.) than under Wt2(.).
The comparative statics follows directly from equations (1.9) and (1.10).
Proposition 4. Given Wt−1(.) and λMt−1, educated women’s marriage probability is an
increasing function of Wt(  wE). Hence if the distribution Wt1(.) ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates Wt2(.), pEt1 ≤ pEt2.
Proof. We need to show that pE(λMt) (as deﬁned in equation (1.6)) is smaller under Wt1(.)
than under Wt2(.). Given Wt−1(.) and λMt−1, λMt does not change with regards to Wt(.)
(see equation (1.1)). pE(λMt) can be rewritten as Wt(  wE)(1 − λMt) + λMt. Since λMt < 1,
pEt is an increasing function of Wt(  wE).
Proposition 5. Suppose Wt(.) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates Wt−1(.) at all t. The
decrease in pE from t −1 to t is larger when (i) the drop in W(  wE) from t− 1 to t is larger
and (ii) the shift in W(.) from t − 2 to t − 1 is smaller.
Proof. Condition (i): From Proposition 4, we know that pE(λMt) decreases in Wt(  wE) given
λMt. Hence a drop in W(  wE) from t − 1 to t helps decrease educated women’s marriage
probability.
Condition (ii): By Proposition 3 and equation (1.1), we know that the increase in λM
from t−1 to t is larger when the (ﬁrst-order stochastically dominating) change in W(.) from
t − 2 to t − 1 is larger. Hence if there is a large positive shift in the wage distribution from
t−2 to t−1, λMt would be much larger than λMt−1. This helps increase educated women’s
marriage probability since pE(λMt) increases in λMt (see equation (1.6)) given Wt(.).
Both (i) and (ii) are needed for the Gold Miss phenomenon to arise. If only condition (i)
holds and there was a signiﬁcant wage growth from t−2 to t−1, then even if there is a large
drop in W(  wE) at t, pE may not fall because there is now a larger fraction of modern type
in the marriage market than at t − 1. Conversely, if only condition (ii) holds and there is
only a trivial change in W(  wE), pE would not fall since a woman (matched to a traditional
type) does not forgo marriage unless her wage is higher than   wE.
91Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics, JGSS Sample
Men Women
Mean SD Mean SD
Birthyear 1953.28 (15.79) 1951.98 (16.72)
Age 50.29 (15.65) 51.58 (16.61)
College graduate 0.33 (0.47) 0.12 (0.32)
LFP 0.80 (0.40) 0.52 (0.50)
Ever married 0.82 (0.38) 0.89 (0.32)
Currently married 0.78 (0.42) 0.72 (0.45)
Mother’s LFP at age 15 0.67 (0.47) 0.69 (0.46)
Mother college graduate 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15)
Father college graduate 0.11 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30)
Rural at age 15 0.45 (0.50) 0.43 (0.50)
N 7,317 8,569
Notes. Means and standard deviations by sex. Data are from the 2000–2008 JGSS. See Appendix A.1.3 for
details. LFP is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the respondent is in the labor force. Mother’s LFP at
age 15 equals 1 if mother had a paying job when respondent was about 15 years old. I exclude respondents
under age 25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey. All observations are weighted by the person
weight.
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of Married Respondents from Gold Miss Countries, ATUS Sample
Men Women
Mean SD Mean SD
Year of birth 1958.32 (14.46) 1960.79 (13.55)
College graduate 0.81 (0.39) 0.61 (0.49)
U.S. born 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.36)
LFP 0.85 (0.36) 0.53 (0.50)
Usual work hours 35.45 (19.56) 22.23 (24.66)
Spouse’s usual work hours 15.68 (20.76) 35.43 (23.00)
ln(Family income) 11.03 (0.81) 10.95 (0.86)
No. of children under 18 0.99 (0.99) 0.86 (1.05)
N 116 163
Notes. Mean and standard deviations by sex, among married respondents whose father’s birthplace is Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, or Taiwan. Data are from the 2003–2011 ATUS. See Appendix A.1.4 for
details. Usual work hours are number of hours per week, and individuals who responded “hours vary” are
excluded. ln(Family income) is the log of family income (in 1999 dollars). I exclude respondents under age
25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey. All observations are weighted by the person weight.
92Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics of Koreans and Japanese in the U.S., Census and ACS Sample
Foreign born U.S. born
Men Women Men Women
Year of birth 1967.71 1966.82 1950.77 1949.08
(9.18) (10.56) (18.15) (18.89)
College graduate 0.61 0.59 0.46 0.43
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
LFP 0.93 0.86 0.73 0.64
(0.26) (0.34) (0.45) (0.48)
ln(Income) 10.60 10.10 10.47 9.98
(1.05) (1.19) (0.99) (1.08)
Ever married 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.80
(0.46) (0.44) (0.44) (0.40)
Currently Married 0.60 0.57 0.60 0.55
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Japanese 0.14 0.18 0.86 0.86
(0.35) (0.38) (0.35) (0.35)
Speaks English well 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.97
(0.20) (0.21) (0.14) (0.16)
Year of immigration 1978.43 1977.32
(9.52) (10.67)
Age at immigration 10.72 10.50
(4.35) (4.54)
N 7,189 7,366 45,238 44,794
Notes. Means and standard deviations by sex and nativity, among Koreans and Japanese in the U.S. Data
are from the 1980, 1990, 2000 Census and 2001–2010 ACS. See Appendix A.1.5 for details. Foreign born only
includes those who migrated to the U.S. between ages 3–17. LFP is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
respondent is in the labor force. ln(Income) is the log of total personal income (in 1999 dollars). “Speaks
English well” is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the respondent “speaks only English,” “speaks English
very well,” or “speaks English well” and 0 if “does not speak English” or “can speak English but not well.”
I exclude respondents under age 25 or still attending school at the time of the survey. All observations are
weighted by the IPUMS person weight.
93Table A.4: Eﬀect of Husband’s Ethnicity and U.S. Nativity on LFP of Korean and Japanese Women
in the U.S.
Dependent variable=1 if participate in labor force
Foreign born U.S. born
KrJp women KrJp women
(1) (2)
Husband not KrJp 0.093*** 0.002
(0.026) (0.010)
Husband U.S. born -0.004 0.024
(0.026) (0.020)
Husband college graduate -0.017 -0.027***
(0.023) (0.010)
ln(Husband’s income) -0.080*** -0.024***
(0.010) (0.005)
College graduate 0.110*** 0.064***
(0.022) (0.010)
No. of children under 18 -0.037*** -0.009**
(0.010) (0.005)
No. of children under 5 -0.116*** -0.131***
(0.017) (0.012)
Control for age Yes Yes
Control for ethnicity Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes
N 5,262 24,637
Dependent variable mean 0.66 0.63
Notes. Eﬀect of husband’s ethnicity and U.S. nativity on labor force participation, among married Korean
and Japanese (KrJp) women in the U.S. Data are from the 1980, 1990, 2000 Census and 2001–2010 ACS.
Controls for both respondent’s and spouse’s age are included. ln(Husband’s income) is the log of husband’s
total personal income (in 1999 dollars). Birth cohort is grouped into six decennial periods, from 1925–1934
to 1975–1985. I exclude respondents who have migrated to the U.S. under age 3 or over 17, who are under
age 25, or still attending school at the time of the survey. Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
94Table A.5: Marrying-Up?, Korean and Japanese Women in the U.S.
Dependent variable=1 if husband’s education is higher than wife’s
Foreign born U.S. born
KrJp women KrJp women
(1) (2)
Husband not Korean or Japanese -0.023 -0.016*
(0.026) (0.010)
Husband U.S. born 0.009 -0.022
(0.026) (0.018)
Husband’s age 0.006*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Education -0.150*** -0.134***
(0.009) (0.004)
Age -0.006** 0.002
(0.002) (0.001)
Control for ethnicity Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes
N 5,379 24,928
Dependent variable mean 0.33 0.26
Notes. Husband’s relative educational attainment, among married Korean and Japanese (KrJp) women in
the U.S. Data are from the 1980, 1990, 2000 Census and 2001–2010 ACS. Educational attainment is divided
into four groups: high school graduate or less, some college, four-year college graduate, and graduate and
professional degrees. The dependent variable equals 1 if husband’s education is higher than wife’s by at
least one step. Birth cohort is grouped into six decennial periods, from 1925–1934 to 1975–1985. I exclude
respondents who have migrated to the U.S. under age 3 or over 17, who are under age 25, or still attending
school at the time of the survey. Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
95Figure A.1: Countries by Female Labor Force Participation Rates in 1985
Notes. High and low female labor force participation (FLFP) countries. FLFP data are from the United
Nations (UN) and are matched to father’s birthplace in the ATUS sample. See Appendix A.1.4 for details.
Father’s birthplace is deﬁned as high (low) FLFP if labor force participation rates of women in age group
25–34 were higher (lower) than that of the U.S. in 1985. Total of 121 countries in the UN data are matched
to the ATUS sample—42 high FLFP (light gray) and 79 low FLFP (dark gray). Unmatched countries (either
because they do not have data on FLFP or because they are not available as father’s birthplace in the ATUS)
are in white.
96B. Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let’s consider each case separately. First, when x > 1 − βMδ, the (LHS) of (PC) is
negative for any 0 < α < 1 whereas the (RHS) is positive (by assumption). (PC) does not
hold and so agenda setter’s proposal for gradualism will always be rejected by the median
voter.
Second, when < 1 −
c1
c2x < 1 − βM, α∗ >   α (see Figure 2.1). There is no α that the
agenda setter would propose instead of BB2 that would also satisfy (PC).
Lastly, when 0 < x < 1 −
c1
c2, α∗ <   α. Since the agenda setter’s utility is decreasing in α
(see equation (2.6)), she proposes the smallest α that satisﬁes (PC).
97C. Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Data Appendix
I weigh all observations using the person weight (WT06) to make the sample represen-
tative. Family income (FAMINCOME) includes the income of all members of the house-
hold who are 15 years of age or older. Income includes money from jobs, net income from
business, pensions, dividends, interest, Social Security payments, and any other monetary
income received by family members. This is the only earnings information available on the
self-employed as well. It is based on categorical data; I calculate the midpoint of the cate-
gorical variable. When top-coded ($75,000 from January to September in 2003 and $150,000
thereafter), it is multiplied by a factor of 1.45.
Individuals whose father’s birthplace (FBPL) is indicated as regions or continents, such as
“Central America n.s.” and “Africa n.s.” are excluded from the analyses. For the countries
that are named or grouped diﬀerently in the ATUS from the United Nations dataset, the
following adjustments have been made (FBPL are assigned the LFP rate of the country in
parenthesis): Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic (Czech Republic); Korea and South Korea
(Republic of Korea); England, Scotland, Wales, United Kingdom, and United Kingdom n.s.
(United Kingdom); Ireland and Northern Ireland (Ireland); Other USSR/Russia and USSR
n.s. (Russian Federation).
98Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics, Married with Spouse Present
First Generation Second Generation
Men Women Men Women
Age 45.52 43.25 56.04 51.28
(12.76) (12.55) (16.95) (17.58)
Educ yrs 12.17 12.26 13.77 13.81
(4.83) (4.54) (3.50) (3.07)
LFP 0.87 0.58 0.64 0.55
(0.33) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
Usual work hours 36.32 19.15 26.54 19.24
(19.09) (20.23) (23.59) (20.61)
Spouse’s usual work hours 19.94 34.51 17.00 26.96
(20.74) (20.26) (20.12) (22.74)
ln(Family income) 10.55 10.57 10.78 10.77
(0.85) (0.87) (0.80) (0.84)
No. of children under 18 1.40 1.41 0.79 0.91
(1.30) (1.30) (1.16) (1.21)
FLFP rate at FBPL 50.72 50.90 58.50 56.84
(17.18) (17.00) (16.05) (15.72)
Mexican origin 0.37 0.37 0.17 0.17
(0.48) (0.48) (0.38) (0.37)
N 3,042 3,564 1,171 1,309
Notes. Mean and standard deviations by sex and generation, among married respondents. Data are from
the 2003–2011 ATUS. See Data Appendix for details. Usual work hours are number of hours per week, and
individuals who responded “hours vary” are excluded. ln(Family income) is the log of family income (in 1999
dollars). FLFP rate at FBPL is the labor force participation rate of women in age group 25–34 at father’s
birthplace in 1985. I exclude respondents under age 25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey. All
observations are weighted by the person weight.
99Table C.2: Assimilation in Housework Time (Including FBPL FE), Married with Spouse Present
Dependent variable: Housework time (hours per week)
Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Second generation 0.057 -0.340 0.640 0.421 -4.098*** -3.613*** -4.224*** -2.962***
(0.432) (0.429) (0.580) (0.614) (0.695) (0.662) (0.860) (0.816)
ln(Family income) -0.045 0.227 -0.345 -0.182 -1.928*** -1.000** -3.048*** -2.211***
(0.192) (0.219) (0.254) (0.287) (0.412) (0.410) (0.489) (0.500)
Usual work hours -0.073*** -0.081*** -0.241*** -0.244***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
Spouse’s usual work hours 0.047*** 0.057*** 0.064*** 0.047**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021)
No. of children under 18 0.118 0.242 1.061*** 0.764**
(0.216) (0.239) (0.354) (0.345)
Age of youngest child in household -0.020 -0.033 0.038 0.166*
(0.046) (0.049) (0.085) (0.085)
Control for age, educ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FBPL FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,868 4,354 3,165 2,843 5,431 5,020 3,653 3,427
Dependent variable mean 4.57 4.58 4.63 4.71 19.28 19.38 21.04 21.12
Notes. Eﬀect of U.S. nativity on housework time, among married respondents. Data are from the 2003-2011 ATUS. See Data Appendix for details.
ln(Family income) is the log of family income (in 1999 dollars). Controls for both respondent’s and spouse’s age and years of education are included.
Controls for both respondent’s and spouse’s age are included. I exclude respondents under age 25 or enrolled in school at the time of the survey. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1
0
0Bibliography
Aguiar, M., and E. Hurst (2007): “Measuring trends in leisure: The allocation of time
over ﬁve decades,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 969–1006.
Akerlof, G. A., and R. E. Kranton (2000): “Economics and Identity,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115(3), 715–753.
Alesina, A. (1988): “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with
Rational Voters,” The American Economic Review, 78(4), 796–805.
Alesina, A., and A. Drazen (1991): “Why Are Stabilizations Delayed,” American Eco-
nomic Review, December(81), 1170–1188.
Alesina, A., and P. Giuliano (2010): “The Power of the Family,” Journal of Economic
Growth, 15(2), 93–125.
Alesina, A., N. Nunn, and P. Guiliano (2011): “Fertility and the Plough,” American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 101(3), 499–503.
Becker, G. S. (1957): The Economics of Discrimination. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
(1991): A Treatise on the Family: Expanded Edition. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge.
Besley, T., and S. Coate (1997): “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1), 85–114.
Bisin, A., A. Lizzeri, and L. Yariv (2011): “Government Policy with Time Inconsistent
Voters,” Mimeo, New York University.
Bisin, A., and T. Verdier (2000): “Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural Transmission, Mar-
riage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115(3), 955–988.
Blau, F. D., and L. M. Kahn (2007): “Gender and Assimilation Among Mexican Amer-
icans,” NBER Working Paper No. 11512.
Blau, F. D., L. M. Kahn, and K. L. Papps (2011): “Gender, Source Country Charac-
teristics, and Labor Market Assimilation Among Immigrants,” The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 93(1), 43–58.
101Borjas, G. J. (1985): “Assimilation, Changes in Cohort Quality, and the Earnings of
Immigrants,” Journal of Labor Economics, 3(4).
Brock, W., and S. Magee (1978): “The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case
of the Tariﬀ,” American Economic Review, 68(2), 246–250.
Chen, J., and D. T. Takeuchi (2011): “Intermarriage, Ethnic Identicy, and Perceived
Social Standing Among Asian Women in the United States,” Journal of Marriage and
Family, 73(4), 876–888.
Chiappori, P.-A., and O. Donni (2011): “Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior:
A Survey of the Literature,” in Household Economic Behaviors, ed. by J. A. Molina, pp.
1–40. Springer.
Congleton, R. D. (1992): “Political Institutions and Pollution Control,” The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 74(3), 412–421.
Cortes, P., and J. Y. Pan (2013): “Outsourcing Household Production: Foreign Domes-
tic Helpers and Native Labor Supply in Hong Kong,” Journal of Labor Economics.
Cortes, P., and J. Tessada (2011): “Low-skilled Immigration and the Labor Supply
of Highly Educated Women,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, vol-
ume(number), pages.
Dewatripont, M., and G. Roland (1992): “The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy
in the Transition to a Market Economy,” Economic Journal, 102, 291–300.
(1995): “The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty,” American Economic
Review, 85, 1207–1223.
Fern´ andez, R., and A. Fogli (2009): “Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs,
Work and Fertility,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(1), 146–177.
Fern´ andez, R., A. Fogli, and C. Olivetti (2004): “Mothers and Sons: Preference
Formation and Female Labor Force Dynamics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4),
1249–1299.
Feyrer, J., B. Sacerdote, and A. D. Stern (2008): “Will the Stork Return to Europe
and Japan? Understanding Fertility within Developed Nations,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 22(3), 3–22.
Giuliano, P. (2007): “Living Arrangements in Western Europe: Does Cultural Origin
Matter?,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(5), 927–952.
Goldin, C. (1990): Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American
Women. Oxford University Press, New York.
(2004): “The Long Road to the Fast Track: Career and Family,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 596, 20–35.
102Goldin, C., and L. Katz (2002): “The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and
Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions,” Journal of Political Economy, 110(4), 730–770.
(2011): “Putting the “Co” in Education: Timing, Reasons, and Consequences of
College Coeducation from 1835 to the Present,” Journal of Human Capital, 5(4), 377–417.
Greenwood, J., and N. Guner (2009): “Marriage and Divorce since World War II:
Analyzing the Role of Technological Progress on the Formation of Households,” in NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2008, vol. 23, pp. 231–276. University of Chicago Press.
Greenwood, J., A. Seshadri, and M. Yorukoglu (2005): “Engines of Liberation,”
Review of Economic Studies, 72(1), 109–133.
Grossman, G., and E. Helpman (1994): “Protection For Sale,” American Economic
Review, 84(4), 833–850.
Guryan, J., E. Hurst, and M. Kearney (2008): “Parental Education and Parental
Time with Children,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(3), 23–46.
Hochschild, A. R. w. A. M. (1989): The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revo-
lution at Home. Viking, New York.
Huang, S., B. S. A. Yeoh, and N. A. Rahman (eds.) (2005): Asian Women as
Transnational Domestic Workers. Marshall Cavendish Academic, Singapore.
Hwang, J. (2013a): “Housewife, “Gold Miss,” and Equal: The Evolution of Educated
Women’s Role in Asia and the U.S.,” Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University.
(2013b): “The Second Shift: Housework Time of Married Couples,” Ph.D. thesis,
Harvard University.
Jones, G. W., and B. Gubhaju (2009): “Trends in Marriage in the Low Fertility Coutries
of East and Southeast Asia,” Asian Population Studies, 5(3), 237–265.
Kalmijn, M. (1991): “Shifting Boundaries: Trends in Religious and Educational Ho-
mogamy,” American Sociological Review, 56(6), 786–800.
Kawaguchi, D., and S. Lee (2012): “Brides for Sale: Cross-Border Marriages and Female
Immigration,” HBS Working Paper No. 12–082.
Laibson, D. (1997): “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 112(2), 443–478.
Lipton, D., and J. Sachs (1990): “Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The
Case of Poland,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 75–133.
Loewenstein, G. (2000): “Emotions in Economics Theory and Economics Behavior,”
American Economic Review, 90(2), 426–432.
103Min, P. G. (2001): “Changes in Korean Immigrants’ Gender Role and Social Status, and
Their Marital Conﬂicts,” Sociological Forum, 16(2), 301–320.
Murphy, K., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1992): “The Transition to a Market Econ-
omy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 889–906.
O’Donoghue, T., and M. Rabin (1999): “Doing It Now or Later,” American Economic
Review, 89(1), 103–124.
Olivetti, C., and E. Patacchini (2012): “Mothers and Friends: Intergenerational Pref-
erence Transimission and Women’s Work Choices,” Unpublished.
Phelps, E. S., and R. A. Pollak (1968): “On Second-Best National Saving and Game-
Equilibrium Growth,” The Review of Economic Studies, 35(2), 185–199.
Roland, G. (2000): Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Rubin, L. (1983): Intimate Strangers: Men and Women Together. Harper and Row, New
York.
Sacerdote, B. (2007): “How Large are the Eﬀects from Changes in Family Environments?
A Study of Korean American Adoptees,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 119–
157.
Schwartz, C. R., and R. D. Mare (2005): “Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage
from 1940 to 2003,” Demography, 42(4), 621–646.
Shang, Q., and B. A. Weinberg (2012): “Opting for Families: Recent Trends in the
Fertility of Highly-Skilled Women,” Journal of Population Economics, pp. 1–28.
Stevenson, B., and J. Wolfers (2007): “Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their
Driving Forces,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(2), 27–52.
Wei, S.-J. (1993): “Gradualism versus Big Bang: Speed and Sustainability of Reforms,”
Mimeo, Harvard University.
104